

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 10, 1983

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


Please reference my letter to you dated November 27, 1981 in response to R. C. Lewis' October 30, 1981 letter to H. G. Parris transmitting IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259, -260, -296/81-28. Enclosed is a revised response to item B of Appendix A of that report. Based upon further research and corrective actions, this item was determined to be reportable. This has been discussed with the senior NRC resident inspector and he concurs with the actions described in the enclosure.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

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USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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REVISED RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-259/81-28, 50-260/81-28, AND 50-296/81-28
R. C. LEWIS' LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS
DATED OCTOBER 30, 1981

Item B - (259/81-28-09, 260/81-28-06, 296/81-28-06)

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by TVA Topical Report, TVA-75-1, paragraph 17.1A.16 requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, conditions adverse to quality were not promptly identified and corrected in that frequent air vacuum valve seal and float damage, plugged vents and a missing valve part for the residual heat removal service water system at the pump rooms had been occurring for an extended period of time without prompt corrective action.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.3.).

1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits a violation occurred as stated.

2. Reasons for the Violation if Admitted

TVA was aware of maintenance problems on pump air vent valves on the residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system. However, because of the design of the valve and type of service, it was expected that valves would require periodic repairs. Failures were intermittent and no overall corrective program was determined to be necessary at that time.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

The broken, upper float guide (missing valve part) was analyzed by the TVA Metallurgical Group for metal defects and none were found. An engineering evaluation of vent valve failures has been performed. All vent valves were examined to determine which type were problem valves. All five of these valves were removed and replaced with new valves which have stronger and improved upper float guides.

4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations

The RHRSW air vacuum valves' operation will be visually examined more thoroughly during the performance of Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 29 in the future to determine if seal and float damage have occurred during operation. All of the RHRSW air vacuum valves were examined to determine which had potential guide failure problems.

Five valves were identified as being the old style APCO. These five valves were changed out with new APCO valves which have a stronger and improved upper guide bar.

5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Full compliance was achieved on May 6, 1983 when the last of the five valves were changed out with new valves.