

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

V A S I P S 3 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 1 5
 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 21 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 55 56

REPORT SOURCE 12 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 2 1 1 5 8 3 8 0 3 1 4 8 3 8
 DOCKET NUMBER 62 66 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

With Unit 1 at cold shutdown and Unit 2 at 100%, it was discovered that MOV-SW-102B would not cycle. On 2/20/83 and 2/22/83, routine testing revealed the MOV-SW-102A would not respond to demand. Inoperability of these valves is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.4.A.5 and is reportable by Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b.(2). The valves were placed under administrative control and all emergency service water equipment remained operable. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
 CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMPR. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRC FORM 502 PRIME COMPR. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

MOV-SW-102B failed due to damaged gears linking the motor to the valve actuator. The gears were replaced and the valve returned to service. Failure of MOV-SW-102A was caused by a faulty motor engage mechanism. This was repaired, the valve tested and returned to operable status.

FACILITY STATUS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
 N POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
 ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
 PUBLICITY REQUEST DESCRIPTION

8303240510

ATTACHMENT 1
SUNNY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-013/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 02-15-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: MALFUNCTION OF MOV-SW-102A AND MOV-SW-102B

1. Description of the Event

On 2/15/83, with Unit 1 at cold shutdown and Unit 2 at 100% power, operations personnel discovered that valve MOV-SW-102B (Service Water Supply to Component Cooling Heat Exchangers) would not cycle electrically. On 2/20/83 and 2/22/83, routine testing revealed that the redundant valve, MOV-SW-102A would not cycle upon demand from the control room.

Inoperability of these valves is contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.A.5, which requires these valves to close automatically in the event of a CLS Hi-Hi signal in coincidence with a loss of offsite power. This event is reportable in accordance with Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

These valves are required to close to ensure that sufficient water is available from the intake canal to the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers during certain post accident conditions. When MOV-SW-102B failed the valve was manually closed and remained closed until it was repaired and returned to service on 2/22/83. On 2/20/83, when MOV-SW-102A was discovered to be malfunctioning, the valve was placed under administrative control and returned to operable status in less than 1 hour after the manual discharge lever was found in the engage position. For the event of 2/22/83, valve MOV-SW-102A was manually closed and MOV-SW-102B was returned to service. At all times during these events, the Emergency Service Water Pumps remained operable and would have provided sufficient water to the intake canal had there been a loss of offsite power. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

Valve MOV-SW-102B would not cycle electrically because several teeth of the gears linking the motor to the valve actuator had been stripped. Failure of MOV-SW-102A was caused by a faulty engage mechanism, which allowed the motor to run without engaging the valve actuator.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action taken for the failure of MOV-SW-102B on 2/15/83 was to manually close the valve and initiate corrective maintenance. The immediate action taken for the failure of MOV-SW-102A on 2/20/83 was to engage the motor by use of the manual engage lever. The valve was then cycled electrically several times, tested in accordance with PT-25.1, and returned to service. On 2/22/83, when MOV-SW-102A failed during performance of PT 25.1 (used to test MOV-SW-102B), the valve was closed manually and declared inoperable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The damaged gears of MOV-SW-102B were replaced. The valve was tested in accordance with PT-25.1 and returned to service on 2/22/83. The faulty engage mechanism of MOV-SW-102A was repaired after the event of 2/22/83. The valve was tested by PT 25.1 and returned to operable status on 2/26/83.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None are required.

7. Generic Implications

None.