

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE C O F S V I LICENSE NUMBER 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 LICENSE TYPE 3 4 1 1 2 0 CAT 58 5

CON'T REPORT SOURCE L DOCKET NUMBER 6 0 5 U 0 0 2 6 7 EVENT DATE 7 0 9 2 2 8 0 REPORT DATE 8 0 6 U 6 8 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During September testing, five of the twelve helium circulator seal malfunction pres-

0 3 sure differential switch units were discovered to have a trip point outside the limits

0 4 of LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3. These are reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifi-

0 5 cations AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2. No affect on public health or safety. Redun-

0 6 dant system available and operable. Similar reports are RO's 77-47, 78-27, 79-32,

0 7 79-56, 80-07, 80-16, 80-20, 80-26, 80-34, and 80-41.

SYSTEM CODE C B CAUSE CODE E CAUSE SUBCODE E COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U COMP. SUBCODE S VALVE SUBCODE Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 8 0 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 1 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 REPORT TYPE X REVISION NO. 1

ACTION TAKEN X FUTURE ACTION X EFFECT ON PLANT Z SHUTDOWN METHOD Z HOURS 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 8 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 ITT Barton Model 289 pressure differential switches failed to actuate at trip point

1 1 due to dirt accumulation in electrical switches. The ITT Barton pressure differential

1 2 indicating switches were replaced with ITT Barton Model 752 pressure transmitters and

1 3 bistable trip modules (Model PT-3D, manufactured by General Atomic Company) via Change

1 4 Notice 1110. No further corrective action is anticipated or required.

FACILITY STATUS G % POWER Q Q Q OTHER STATUS N/A METHOD OF DISCOVERY C DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operability Test

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER Q Q Q TYPE Z DESCRIPTION N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER Q Q Q DESCRIPTION N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z DESCRIPTION N/A

PUBLICITY ISSUED N DESCRIPTION N/A

NAME OF PREPARER [Signature] PHONE: (303) 785-2224

8306280288 830606
PDR ADOCK 05000267
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

GPO 917-926

REPORT DATE: June 6, 1983

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-51

ISSUE 1

OCCURRENCE DATE: September 22, 1980

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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651-9298

REPORT NO. 50-267/80-51/03-X-1

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF
OCCURRENCE:

During the September monthly check of the helium circulator seal malfunction pressure differential switches, it was discovered that five of twelve switch units tripped outside the limits specified in LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-3.

These are reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specifications AC 7.5.2(b)1 and AC 7.5.2(b)2.

EVENT
DESCRIPTION:

During a maintenance shutdown period, instrument personnel performed the circulator seal malfunction (buffer-mid-buffer) switch operability check. The switches are normally calibrated on an annual basis; however, due to the problems cited in the previous reports as listed on the LER, a check of buffer-mid-buffer trip settings on a monthly basis was undertaken as an interim measure to test operability.

There are twelve buffer-mid-buffer switch units, three per circulator. Each switch unit contains two electrical switches. The range of the sensing element is from (-) 100 inches of water to zero to (+) 100 inches of water. One of the electrical switches in each unit must operate at greater than or equal to (-) 10 inches water (negative buffer-mid-buffer), and the other electrical switch must operate at less than or equal to (+) 80 inches water (positive buffer-mid-buffer) per Table 4.4-3.

The trip settings for the twelve switch units are listed in Table 1.

The switch settings which were found to be less conservative than those established by the Technical Specification did not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of the system.

CAUSE
DESCRIPTION:

Dirt buildup and accumulation in the electrical switches prevented them from making proper contact.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

The trip settings of the electrical switches were re-adjusted to the proper trip points.

Due to the continuing problems being experienced with the electrical switches, the interim check of the trip settings was conducted on a monthly basis.

The problem was investigated, and the process activated pressure differential switches were replaced with pressure differential transmitters and solid state dual bistable trip modules. The new units eliminate the use of electrical contacts and, therefore, reduce the probability of fouling by dirt and/or corrosion from the working environment. This modification was performed via Public Service Company Change Notice 1110.

No further corrective actions are anticipated or required.


TABLE 1


		As Found Inches H ₂ O		As Left Inches H ₂ O	
		Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point	Increasing Trip Point	Decreasing Trip Point
1A Circulator	PDIS-21149	+74	- 6	+74	-6
	PDIS-21151	+75	- 6	+75	-6
	PDIS-21153	+76	- 5	+76	-5
1B Circulator	PDIS-21155	+77	- 7	+77	-7
	PDIS-21157	+75	- 24 ①	+75	-6
	PDIS-21159	+75	-100 ①	+75	-6
1C Circulator	PDIS-21150	+76	- 20 ①	+76	-9
	PDIS-21152	+77	- 17 ①	+77	-9
	PDIS-21154	+76	- 5	+76	-5
1D Circulator	PDIS-21156	+73	- 7	+73	-7
	PDIS-21158	+73	- 7	+73	-7
	PDIS-21160	+75	-100 ①	+75	-6

① Denotes switches which were out of tolerance.

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