NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Field	Value
LICENSEE CODE (2)	V A S P S 2
LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
CAT (5)	
REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1
EVENT DATE (8)	0 2 1 7 8 3
REPORT DATE (9)	0 3 1 7 8 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

With Unit 2 at 100% power, operators discovered heat tracing panels 8 & 9 circuit 2 & 13 (BATP suction from BAST and BIT recirc. to BAT) tagged out and de-energized. This is contrary to T.S.3.2.C.5 and 3.3.A.4 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). During the period the circuits were de-energized, operators logged adequate discharge pressures for the BATP's and verified blended flow. Also, the BIT recirc. flow was verified immediately after the discovery of the event. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
S H	A	B	Z Z Z Z Z Z	Z	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	0 0 7	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	H	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	Z	Z Z Z Z

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause has been attributed to an operator improperly performing a tagout procedure. Tagout instructions were to lift the leads only which would have only de-energized part of the circuit. The circuits were immediately energized and verified operable in accordance with PT 27.

FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
E	1 0 0	N/A	A	Personnel Observation

ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z	Z	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
0 0 0	Z	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
0 0 0	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
Z	N/A

PUBLICITY

ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)
N	

8303240472 830317
PDR ADOCK 05000281
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 83-007/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 02-17-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: LOSS OF HEAT TRACING

1. Description of the Event

With Unit 2 at 100% power, operators discovered heat tracing panels 8, and 9, circuit 2 and 13 (boric acid pumps suction from BAST and BIT recirc. to BAST) tagged out and de-energized to facilitate the installation of the new heat tracing system. The loss of these circuits is contrary to Technical Specification 3.2.C.5 and 3.3.A.4 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The heat tracing circuits are intended to maintain boric acid temperatures above that needed for flow. During the period the circuits were de-energized, the fluid temperatures remained above 145°F due to storage tank and Boron Injection Tank Heaters. Additionally, operators logged adequate discharge pressures of the operating boric acid transfer pumps and verified blended flow. The BIT recirculation remained in service and flow was verified immediately following the discovery of the de-energized circuits. The heat tracing was returned to service within the time allowed by Technical Specifications. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

3. Cause

The loss of heat tracing was due to an operator improperly performing a tagout procedure. Instructions on the tags were to lift the leads only, which would have de-energized only part of the circuits. However, the operator opened the circuit breakers and the result was the total loss of the subject heat tracing circuits.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

Periodic Test 18.4 was performed to verify BIT recirculation flow. The heat tracing circuits were energized immediately and verified functional in accordance with PT 27 following the discovery of the event.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

None.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Operators involved were disciplined and all operations personnel were instructed to carefully scrutinize all future tagout requests. In addition, the jumper procedure will be cited on future tagouts where lifted leads are required.

7. Generic Implications

None.