

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)80CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 4 80

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) N/A  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60  
NRC USE ONLY

NRC USE ONLY

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PDR ADCK 05000334  
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Attachment to LER 83-015/03L  
Beaver Valley Power Station  
Duquesne Light Company  
Docket No. 50-334

An investigation into the root cause of this event has revealed that a number of factors contributed to this incident. The relay being tested (87109X) cannot be cleared by itself without isolating a substantial portion of the protection circuitry for the 1B System Station Service Transformer. Therefore, the relay was tested uncleared. Testing of this relay uncleared should have posed no problem since this is a D.C. relay and should not operate on the low A.C. test voltages applied to the contacts. Conversations with the Substations and Shops Supervisor has disclosed that unknown to the relay crew, there was a capacitor installed under DCP 004 on the negative of the battery input to the inverter for surge suppression. This capacitor inadvertently discharged when the test signal was applied to the relay contacts and activated relay 51-VD06X. The reason the capacitor discharged, was due to the test equipment being used, which utilized a grounded A.C. source. This ground provided a "potential path" for current flow, and allowed discharging of the capacitor to occur. When relay 51-VD106X activated, breaker 1D10 (the feeder breaker to the Emergency Bus) tripped open. This action caused a "dead bus" condition on the Emergency 4KV Bus. This Dead Bus situation initiated an autostart of the diesel generator. After the diesel generator attained design output voltage, the output breaker closed in and auto-sequencing of all appropriate loads occurred. The test which lead to the spurious activation of relay 51-VD106X was rerun. Upon subsequent performances of the relay test, relay 51-VD106X activated each time as it did in the initial event. This provided verification that it was the actual test (not the shorting of contacts or carelessness on the part of the technician) which caused the relay actuation.

Relay personnel will be reinstructed in the performance of tests on circuits such as this, and others which require special test considerations, to preclude future occurrences of such events.



**Duquesne Light**

Nuclear Division  
P. O. Box 4  
Shippingport, PA 15077-0004

Telephone (412) 393-6000

June 17, 1983  
ND1SS1:870

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1  
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66  
LER 83-015/03L


Mr. J. M. Allen<sup>a</sup>, Acting Regional Administrator  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Allen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications,  
the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 83-015/03L, Technical Specification 3.8.2.1, Onsite Power Distribution Systems.

Very truly yours,

  
Wm. S. Lacey  
Station Superintendent

Attachment

IE22  
1/1

J. M. Allen  
ND1SS1:870  
June 17, 1983  
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cc: Director of Management & Program Analysis  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

C. A. Roteck, Ohio Edison

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Headquarters  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Peter Tam, BVPS Licensing Project Manager  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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