

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58									

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REPORT SOURCE

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60	61									68	69						74	75						80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE								REPORT DATE						

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

Q 2 While performing "FUEL MOVEMENT OPERATION" procedure (HNP-2-9302),

Q 3 personnel discovered that the eleven fuel assemblies loaded into the

Q 4 core, were loaded out of proper core orientation. The first eight fuel

Q 5 assemblies loaded in the core around the Source Range Monitors (SRM's)

Q 6 were loaded contrary to the requirement of Tech. Specs. section

Q 7 4.9.2.c.2. Plant conditions were not affected by this event. The health

Q 8 and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

09		SYSTEM CODE R C		11	CAUSE CODE A		12	CAUSE SUBCODE 3		13	COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z					14	COMP. SUBCODE Z		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16										
7	8	9	10		11		12		13					18		19		20														
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 3		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 1		24	25	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		28	29	REPORT TYPE T		30	REVISION NO. 0		32										
ACTION TAKEN H		FUTURE ACTION X		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		33	34	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		36	HOURS 0 0 0 0		37	38	39	40	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		41	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		42	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		43	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9		44	45	46	47	
18		19		20				21										22			23			24		25		26				

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event was attributed to personnel error. Personnel

1 1 entered fuel assembly data into computer, but applied this data in error

1 2 to HNP-1-9302 instead of HNP-2-9302 with the computer printing refueling

1 3 data on Unit 2 procedure letterhead. Responsible personnel were counsel-

ed and the computer procedural data has been corrected.

8 9 FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 H 0 0 0 29 NA OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A Operator Observation DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 2 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	000	(37) Z	(38) NA	(39)				

PERSONNEL INJURIES	
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
1 8	0 0 0 (40) NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
NA

1 9
7 8 9 10

8306270328 830609
PDR ADDCK 05000366
S PDR


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								PUBLICITY									NRC USE ONLY			
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION						(45)												
2	0	N	(44)	NA																
7	8	9	10							68	69								80	

NAME OF PREPARER S. B. Tipps

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

June 9, 1983
GM-83-471

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366


United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


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USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.8.i. of Hatch Unit Two Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-366/1983-031.


H. C. Nix
General Manager


HCN/STB/abb

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J. T. Beckham, Jr.
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NARRATIVE REPORT
FOR LER 50-366/1983-031

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 14-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.8.i.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

On May 30, 1983, the plant was in Refuel.

Detailed description of the event(s):

While performing "FUEL MOVEMENT OPERATION" procedure (HNP-2-9302), personnel discovered that the eleven fuel assemblies loaded into the core, had been loaded out of proper core orientation. The first eight fuel assemblies loaded were not loaded in their previous core position around their respective SRM. Instead, they were loaded on the opposite side of the core around another SRM, which is contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 4.9.2.C.2.

Consequences of the event(s):

Unit 2 core alterations were suspended; however, plant condition was not affected by this event. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

At the time of discovery, all SRM's had greater than the minimum count rate required (3 counts per second) for core alterations. All refueling interlocks were operational per "REFUELING INTERLOCKS AND HOIST LIMIT CHECKS" procedure (HNP-2-3940) with shorting links removed.

Justification for continued operation:

Justification for continued operation is not required, since the unit was in Refueling during this event.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This is a non-repetitive event.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

There was no impact to other systems, nor was there any impact on Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

The cause of this event was attributed to personnel error. Personnel used Unit 1's core orientation program to compute and print HNP-2-9302, Data Package 3 (this Data Package is used to prepare fuel movement schedules for a full core reload). This resulted in eleven fuel assemblies' being loaded into Unit 2's core 180 degrees out of proper core orientation; this was due to the fact that the orientation of the two cores is 180 degrees out of phase.

Immediate Corrective Action:

The following are the immediate corrective actions implemented as a result of this event:

1. Core alterations were suspended until other corrective actions could be implemented.
2. Responsible personnel were counseled and retrained.
3. Procedure HNP-2-9302 and its data sheets were revised, corrected and then verified as being correct before resuming refueling operations.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

No supplemental corrective action was required.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No scheduled future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

The computer program will be revised to first ask the operator the Unit the data is to be used on. It will then apply this data to the correct core orientation program for the respective unit.