

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 4/28/83

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION										APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011									
FORM 366 (12-81) 10 CFR 50										LICENSEE EVENT REPORT									
CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
[01] [A] [L] [B] [R] [F] [2] [2] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [3] [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] [4] [] [] [5]										7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34									
CONT										REPORT SOURCE [L] [6] [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [2] [6] [0] [7] [0] [3] [3] [0] [2] [2] [8] [0] [6] [1] [6] [8] [3] [9]									
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																			
[02] During a maintenance outage on unit 2 to repair main steam relief valve (MSRV)																			
[03] numbered PCV-1-180 the air operator was found to have been assembled incorrectly.																			
[04] Maintenance procedures which check for proper operability of valve components																			
[05] were not followed during installation of the MSRV (T.S. 6.7.2.b(3)). All other																			
[06] MSRVs were operable. There was no effect on public health or safety.																			
[07]																			
[08]																			
SYSTEM CODE [C] [C] [11] CAUSE CODE [A] [12] CAUSE SUBCODE [C] [13] COMPONENT CODE [V] [A] [L] [V] [O] [P] [14] COMP. SUBCODE [D] [15] VALVE SUBCODE [Z] [16]																			
[09]																			
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8] [3] [17] EVENT YEAR [8] [3] [21] [22] SHUTDOWN METHOD [A] [21] [36] HOURS [0] [0] [7] [7] [22] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] [23] [40] [41] NPRO-4 FORM SUB. [N] [24] [42] PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [N] [25] [43] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [T] [0] [2] [0] [44] [47]																			
ACTION TAKEN [X] [18] [33] FUTURE ACTION [G] [19] [34] EFFECT ON PLANT [A] [20] [35]																			
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)																			
[10] Target Rock Model No. 7567F-100 was inoperable due to not following procedure																			
[11] in reassembly. Inspection didn't detect error due to procedural inadequacy.																			
[12] Valve was repaired. Inspection procedure is being revised. Investigation of the																			
[13] valve reassembly has been performed and additional details are provided on LER																			
[14] Supplemental.																			
FACILITY STATUS [E] [28] [30] % POWER [0] [0] [0] [29] [31] OTHER STATUS [NA] [32] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] [33] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [During repair work] [34]																			
[15]																			
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE [Z] [33] [35] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] [36] LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] [37]																			
[16]																			
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0] [0] [0] [37] [38] TYPE [Z] [39] DESCRIPTION [NA] [40]																			
[17]																			
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0] [0] [0] [40] [41] DESCRIPTION [NA] [42]																			
[18]																			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] [42] [43] DESCRIPTION [NA] [44]																			
[19]																			
PUBLICATION ISSUED DESCRIPTION [Y] [44] [45] TVA toll free nuclear information line.																			
[20]																			
NAME OF PREPARER E. T. Holder										PHONE (205) 729-0885									

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 16, 1983

83 JUN 21 09:41

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83014 - REVISION 1

The enclosed report is a supplement to my letter dated April 28, 1983,
concerning an incorrectly assembled main steam relief valve. This report
is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 2 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b(3).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

OFFICIAL COPY
OFFICIAL COPY

IE 22

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83014R1 Technical Specification Involved 3.6.D

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3) * Date Due NRC 6/15/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 85 percent power, unit 2 was shut down for repair of a main steam relief valve and unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. During repair of main steam relief valve numbered PCV-1-180 it was discovered that the air operator was incorrectly installed on the main steam relief valve. The apparent cause was personnel error because maintenance procedures were not followed in originally reassembling the valve. (Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3)). There was no effect on public health or safety. All other relief valves were operable.

Due to procedural inadequacy, personnel erred by not completely performing the specified visual inspection of the relief valve air operator thus resulting in an inoperable relief valve. This inspection should have detected the original reassembly error. The solenoid was checked for proper operation but the air operator was not completely inspected through a viewing access port. A contributing factor was a change in personnel between original reassembly and reinstallation. The air operator was removed, inspected and reinstalled. The personnel involved have been instructed to follow procedures. The procedural clarification will be made by June 15, 1983.

The investigation of the air operator installation on MSRV PCV-1-180 revealed that the air operator was not installed at the Wyle test site but was shipped independently to Browns Ferry and assembled on site. The air operator was improperly installed due to a procedure which lacked necessary detail to ensure that the collet and pilot stem were properly coupled and a verification step by a responsible individual.

The engineer that was responsible for valve reassembly erred by not controlling documentation as required by the maintenance procedure. The engineer is no longer employed by TVA. The maintenance procedure will be revised prior to any further air operator installation to include additional verifications during reassembly and traceability of the air operator to valve body.

* Previous Similar Events

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP