

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 1 | L | L | S | C | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34  
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 56

CONT

0 1 | R | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 9  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35  
 REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During evaluation of the turbine bypass valve system response time requirements  
 0 3 | specified in Tech. Spec. 4.7.10.b.3, it was determined that data from LIS-EH-03 had  
 0 4 | been improperly evaluated. Turbine bypass valves #2 and #5 did not fast open. Three  
 0 5 | of the five valves opened within required limits. Safe plant operation was maintained  
 0 6 | at all times.

0 7 |  
 0 8 |  
 7 8 9 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE H E 11 CAUSE CODE X 12 CAUSE SUBCODE C X 13 COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 ACTION TAKEN 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 FUTURE ACTION 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 EFFECT ON PLANT 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 SHUTDOWN METHOD 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 HOURS 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 NPD-4 FORM SUB. 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 18 G 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Control circuitry for valves #2 and #5 had been wired incorrectly. The circuits were  
 1 1 | rewired, and the valves were found to be within required limits. Incorrect data  
 1 2 | evaluation stemmed from misinterpretation of the flow to valve position ratio. When  
 1 3 | the flow/valve position is determined, procedure changes will be made stating required  
 1 4 | valve position.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS B 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 32  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
 1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
 1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
 1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
 1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
 2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45  
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

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NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

K. Kalmon

PHONE:

(815) 357-6761



**Commonwealth Edison**  
LaSalle County Nuclear Station  
Rural Route #1, Box 220  
Marseilles, Illinois 61341  
Telephone 815/357-6761

June 8, 1983

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Administrator  
Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #83-049/03L-0 Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(a) Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those established by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.

G. J. Diederich  
Superintendent  
LaSalle County Station

GJD/GW/rg

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
Director of Management Information & Program Control  
U.S. NRC Document Management Branch  
Inpo-Records Center  
File/NRC

JUN 20 1983

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- I. LER NUMBER: 83-049/03L-0
- II. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit 1
- III. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373
- IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On May 20, 1983, at 0830 hours during an evaluation of whether the turbine bypass valve system could meet the response time requirements as specified in Technical Specifications 4.7.10.b.3, it was noted that the data taken for LIS-EH-03, Turbine Bypass System Response Time Test, on June 17, 1982, had been improperly evaluated and that the #2 and #5 turbine bypass valves did not meet the 200 msec response time limit.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS OCCURRENCE:

Three of the five turbine bypass valves opened within the required limits of the Technical Specifications. The response times of the other two were less than 300 msec. The bypass system was always capable of proper response to high reactor pressure. Safe plant operation was maintained at all times.

VI. CAUSE:

After evaluation of turbine bypass valve control circuitry it was found that the #2 and #5 turbine bypass valves had been wired incorrectly. An "a" contact in the #2 BPV logic was incorrectly wired as a "b" contact. A "b" contact in the #5 BPV logic was incorrectly wired as an "a" contact.

The improper evaluation of the data taken for LIS-EH-03 on June 17, 1982, stemmed from personnel error coupled with misinterpretation of the rated flow to valve position ratio as a linear relationship, i.e., correlation of 80% rated flow with 80% valve position.

VII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

#2 and #5 turbine bypass valves were rewired under Work Request L24818. The valves were then tested under LST-83-61, BPV Response Time Test, and were found to be within the 200 msec limit. All the turbine bypass valves are full open in less than 200 msec.

To prevent future misinterpretation of 80% flow position as 80% valve position, an AIR #1-1-83-67014 has been initiated to change LIS-EH-03 in accordance with the results of STP-26, Relief Valves. An AIR, #1-1-83-67013, was also in effect to change Technical Specifications 4.7.10.b.3 in accordance with STP-26 results within 90 days of test completion.

Prepared by: Kenneth J. Kalmon