

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	I	D	C	C	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5					
7	8	LICENSEE CODE										14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 7 0 6 0 3 8 3 8 0 6 1 6 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | SCHEDULED TEST ON CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM WAS BEING PERFORMED WHEN OPERATORS
03 | INADVERTANTLY CLOSED A MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE ON THE HEAT EXCHANGER OF THE TRAIN
04 | NOT UNDER TEST RENDERING BOTH TRAINS INOPERABLE. THIS IS NON-CONSERVATIVE WITH
05 | RESPECT TO T.S. 3.6.2.1. SURV. TEST CONDITIONS REQUIRE THE CONT. SPRAY HX INLET
06 | AND OUTLET VALVES TO BE CLOSED DURING TEST TO PREVENT THE INADVERTANT SPRAYING OF
07 | CONTAINMENT. SIMILAR EVENTS WERE REPORTED VIA LER 315/77-38 AND 16/80-033.
08 | THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WERE NOT AFFECTED.

SYSTEM CODE S A (11)		CAUSE CODE A (12)		CAUSE SUBCODE A (13)		COMP. SUBCODE E (15)		VALVE SUBCODE D (16)	
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 8		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1		REPORT TYPE T		REVISION NO. 0			
ACTION TAKEN H (18)		FUTURE ACTION Z (19)		EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)		HOURS 0 0 0 0 (22)	
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24)		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L (25)		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER W 0 3 0 (26)			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 TWO OPERATORS USING OUR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION METHOD CLOSED THE WRONG VALVE
1 1 WHICH RENDEPED THE TRAIN NOT UNDER TEST INOPERABLE. APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE
1 2 ACTION WAS TAKEN WITH THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICT
1 3 ADHERENCE TO INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION HAS BEEN STRESSED TO THE OPERATORS
1 4 INVOLVED. SEE SUPPLEMENT.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
E	(28)	1	0	0	(29)	NA	B	(31)	OPERATOR OBSERVATION
ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			
1	6	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Z	(33)	Z	(34)	NA					
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION			
1	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	0	0	0	(37)	(38)	NA			
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION					
1	8	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	0	0	0	(40)		NA			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Z	(42)					NA			
PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION					
2	0	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
N	(44)					NA			

NAME OF PREPARER D. F. KRAUSE

PHONE: (616) 465-5901

27) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRES THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER INLET AND OUTLET VALVES TO BE CLOSED DURING TEST TO PREVENT THE INADVERTANT SPRAYING OF CONTAINMENT. THE HEAT EXCHANGER INLET VALVES ARE LOCATED NEAR EACH OTHER AND ARE OPERATED BY REACH RODS. TWO OPERATORS USING OUR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION METHOD CLOSED THE WRONG VALVE WHICH RENDERED THE TRAIN NOT UNDER TEST INOPERABLE. THIS WAS DISCOVERED BY A SUPERVISOR WHO WAS PROVIDING A THIRD PARTY VERIFICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN WITH THE TWO INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. THE IMPORTANCE OF STRICT ADHERENCE TO INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION HAS BEEN STRESSED TO THE OPERATORS INVOLVED.



INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
P.O. Box 458, Bridgman, Michigan 49106
(616) 465-5901

June 16, 1983


Mr. J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Operating License DPR-74
Docket No. 50-316

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report No. 83-048/01T-0. We initially advised you of this event on June 3, 1983. At this time we explained that during an Operational Surveillance Test we made both Containment Sprays inoperable for a time period of approximately 15 minutes. Further investigation as defined in the attached Licensee Event Report and our own internal investigations reveal that the 15 minutes initially identified in our 24-hour letter to you was an approximated time based on all the actions necessary to restore the system after our Independent Verification Program found the lineup to be in error. The total time to resolve this event from the time listed on the Clearance, from the tags being hung to when the Clearance was checked and accepted, was 27 minutes.

Sincerely,


W.G. Smith, Jr.
Plant Manager

/bab

cc: John E. Dolan
M.P. Alexich
R.F. Kroeger
B. Germano
E.R. Swenson/N.E. DuBry, RO:III
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