

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE 60 L 61 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 5 1 7 8 3 8 0 6 1 6 8 3 9  
7 8 DOCKET NUMBER 58 59 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On May 17, 1983, with unit at CSD, 'B' RHR pump was removed from service, on two  
03 occasions, due to cavitation. This resulted in less than two operable RHR loops  
04 and no loops in operation. This is contrary to T. S. 3.1.A.1.d and reportable  
05 per T. S. 6.6.2.b(2). The cold water used to increase RCS level maintained  
06 RCS temperature, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.  
07  
08

09 SYSTEM CODE 9 C F 10 11 CAUSE CODE 11 E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 X 13 COMPONENT CODE 13 I N S T R U 14 15 COMP. SUBCODE 15 I 16 VALVE SUBCODE 16 Z 17  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 8 3 22 23 24 0 2 4 25 26 27 28 0 3 29 30 31 L 32 33 0  
ACTION TAKEN 33 F 34 35 Z 36 37 Z 38 39 Z 40 41 0 0 0 0 42 43 Y 44 45 N 46 47 L 48 49 Z Z Z Z 50  
FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 40 NPD-4 FORM SUB. 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 An inaccurate standpipe level indication resulted in the cavitation of 'B' RHR pump.  
11 RCS level was increased, RHR pump vented and returned to service. Adjustments were  
12 made to the standpipe level indicator.  
13  
14

15 FACILITY STATUS 9 G 10 28 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT 9 Z 10 33 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
20 PUBLICITY 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
21 ISSUED 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

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PDR ADOCK 05000280  
S PDRIE 22  
NRC USE ONLY

J. L. Wilson

(804) 357-3184

# Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
Surry Power Station  
P. O. Box 315  
Surry, Virginia 23883

JUN 16 1983

Serial No: 83-044

Docket No: 83-280

License No: DER-32

USNRC REGION 1  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA  
AIO: 01

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

Report Number


Applicable Technical Specification

83-024/03L-0

6.6.2.b (2)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

  
J. L. Wilson  
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk, USNRC  
016 Phillips Bldg.  
Washington, D. C. 20555

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL  
Certified By CHB

IE 22  
11

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO: 50-280

REPORT NO: 83-024/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 05-17-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: RHR INOPERABLE

1. Description of the Event

On 05-17-83, at 0948, with the unit at CSD and drained to mid-nozzle, residual heat removal pump 1-RH-P-1B motor amperes were found to be oscillating. The pump was temporarily removed from service, vented, and returned to service. The total time that RHR was out of service was 1 hour and 21 minutes. Later, at 1328, 1-RH-P-1B was found again to be cavitating. The pump was temporarily removed from service, vented, and returned to service. The total time that RHR was out of service was 35 minutes. Both events are contrary to Technical Specification 3.1.A.1.d and reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

A single reactor coolant loop or residual heat removal loop provides sufficient capacity for removal of decay heat.

With the loops drained to mid-nozzle, and thereby unavailable for heat removal, and the 'B' RH pump cavitating, only one RHR loop was possibly operable. RHR temperature was 86°F prior to the event and was still at 86° when RHR pump was returned to service.

Since a charging pump was operating and filling the reactor coolant system from the RWST, heat was being removed from the core. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

Cavitation of 'B' RHR pump was caused by the reactor coolant level dropping below the required NPSH. An inaccurate standpipe level caused the system to be operated in this condition.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The B pump was vented and returned to service.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The erroneous standpipe level was temporarily corrected.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The standpipe level indication will be permanently repaired. Consideration will be given to an improved level indication system.

7. Generic Implications

None.