

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 C A S O S 3 2 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T
0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 6 2 7 0 5 0 9 8 3 8 0 6 0 8 8 3 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 A contractor Quality Assurance (QA) inspection identified a partial disengagement of
0 3 the rod end bushing on the Mechanical Shock arrestor (snubber) installed on pipe
0 4 support P/S S3-CS-027-H-026. As a result, Bechtel QC initiated a Non-Conformance Report
0 5 (NCR) 3-336 on May 4, 1983, which was received, validated and issued by SCE QA on
0 6 May 9, 1983 (See Attachment).
0 7
0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE S B 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE S U P P O R T 14 COMP. SUBCODE D 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 LER NO. REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRC-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 P 0 2 9 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The snubber was inoperable because the bearing assembly was not properly secured
1 1 (by staking) as required by the code. The snubber was reworked and declared operable
1 2 at 0441 on 5/13/83. An engineering evaluation in accordance with Surveillance
1 3 Requirement 4.7.6.g determined that the SDCS was not adversely affected by the
1 4 snubber's inoperability. (See attachment)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 5 FACILITY STATUS B 26 0 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Non-Routine Inspection 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

NAME OF PREPARED

H. B. RAY

PHONE

714/492-7700

NRC USE ONLY

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. B. RAY

STATION MANAGER

June 8, 1983

RECEIVED
NRC

1983 JUN 13 PM 12:45

SCE

REGION V

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator


Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 83-013
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-15 for San Onofre Unit 3, this submittal provides a 30-day written report and a copy of the Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) 3.7.6 and 3.4.1.4.1 associated with an inoperable snubber on the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS). Enclosed LER 83-013 addresses the event.

If there are any questions regarding this event, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER 83-013

11 7E-22
83-250

June 8, 1983

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
R. J. Pate (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
P. J. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-013
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 3, DOCKET NO. 50-362

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR EVENT DESCRIPTION AND
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

With the Unit in Mode 5, this snubber on the common line for SDCS Train A and B was declared inoperable on May 9, 1983, at 1100. The Action Statement associated with LCO 3.7.6 requires that the snubber be returned to operable status within 72 hours. As the snubber was not returned to operable status within 72 hours, the SDCS was declared inoperable and LCO 3.4.1.4.1 Action Statement 'a' for the SDCS was invoked on May 12, 1983, at 1100. Public health and safety were not affected.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Inspection of the disengaged bearing has shown that loads imposed on the snubber have not damaged the bearing assembly. Therefore, the ability of the snubber to perform as designed has not been limited by the partial disengagement of the bearing. Consequently, no adverse effects to components attached to this snubber have occurred. A recent visual inspection completed on April 18, 1983, of all Unit 2 safety related snubbers, per S023-I-2.29, Rev. 4, identified only one snubber in a non-safety related system with a loose spherical bearing assembly. Consequently, a special inspection of additional snubbers to determine the operability of other snubbers is not considered necessary at this time, since normal snubber surveillance required by the Technical Specifications will be conducted in the near future. Corrective actions including any repairs if identified by this surveillance will be reported in a revised LER.

SCE QA has taken corrective action to prevent recurrence (of the delay in the NCR process) in that Bechtel and Edison QA are undergoing retraining on the importance of immediate validation and documentation of nonconforming conditions. This will be completed by June 17, 1983.