

CONTROL BLOCK:

						(1)
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0	1	G	A	E	I	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5						
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58					

REPORT SOURCE 0 1 7 8
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
DOCKET NUMBER 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 7 0 2 0 4 8 3 8 0 2 2 4 8 3 9
EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

0 2 While the plant was being refueled and during performance of a system walkdown, a circuit was found not terminated. This circuit was to supply essential control power to trip the circulating water pump feeder breakers on a Div. 2 condenser bay flooding signal. FSAR section Q11.6.1 requires that this circuit meet IEEE-279. The Div. 1 logic was found in compliance. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

09		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
		H	F	B		C		C	K	T	B	R	K	F	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.					
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34				
17		8	3	0	1	1	0	3	L		0				
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED					
35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46				
X	Z	Z		Z		0	0	0	0	Y					
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER											
47	48	49	50	51	52										
A		N		W	1	2	0								

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of this event is attributed to an improper construction insta-

1 1 llation. A non-essential circuit was found feeding the circulating water

1 2 pump feeder breakers, and this circuit was disconnected and the correct

1 3 essential source terminated with a plant maintenance request.

1	4																	80	
7	8	9																	
FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS			(30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION						(32)
1	5	H	(28)	0	0	0	(29)	NA		C	(31)	Nonroutine Inspection							
7	8	9		10	11	12	13			45	46							80	

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA

7 8 9 10 11 44

NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

45 46

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	7	000	(37) Z	(38) NA (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES				8303210393 830224		80
NUMBER				PDR ADDOCK 05000321		
DESCRIPTION				S		
1	8	0	0	0	NA	
				(40)		
					PDR	

[illegible]

7 8 9 10 80
 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)

7	8	9	10	NA	68	69	80
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PHONE: 912-367-7851

LER #: 50-321/1983-011
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1983-011

On February 4, 1983, while the plant was being refueled, a circuit was found not terminated during a Southern Company Services walkdown for purposes not associated with this event. This circuit was to supply essential power to trip the circulating water pump feeder breakers on a Div. 2 condenser bay flooding signal. Instead, a non-essential circuit was found supplying these feeders which should have been removed by a previous design change request. FSAR Section Q11.6.1 requires that all initiating circuitry in the condenser bay flooding logic meet IEEE-279, i.e. redundant, failsafe circuits in conduits. Div. 1 of this logic was found in compliance. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

The cause of this event is attributed to an improper construction installation at the time of the logic change. Upon discovery, the non-essential circuit was disconnected and the essential source terminated in the 4KV bus by a plant maintenance request.

A generic review for Hatch 2 revealed no similar problems with its Div. 1 or Div. 2 condenser bay flooding logic.