

## UPDATE REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 8/19/82

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

CONT

01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 9

DOCKET NUMBER 53 54 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | While performing SI 4.7.C.1 prior to refueling, secondary containment integrity

03 | could not be confirmed on unit 2, (T.S. 3.7.C.1). Test results approached but

04 | did not meet, technical specification requirements. In accordance with T.S.

05 | 4.7.C.2 subsequent tests were performed on units 1 and 3 and yielded similar

06 | results as found on unit 2. There was no effect on public health and safety.

07 | All units were placed in cold shutdown and there were no releases in excess of

08 | maximum permissible concentrations.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | S | H | 11 | CAUSE CODE | X | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | Z | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16

17 | LEAK/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 5 | 3 | 23 | 24 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 1 | 27 | 28 | REPORT TYPE | X | 29 | REVISION NO. | 1 | 30 | 31

ACTION TAKEN | X | 19 | FUTURE ACTION | Y | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | A | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | B | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Investigation revealed a relief panel in the unit 1 steam tunnel was displaced,

11 | allowing inleakage from the turbine building into secondary containment. The

12 | relief panel was replaced and other leakage paths were sealed. Secondary con-

13 | tainment tests were successfully accomplished.

14 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 8 | 4 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Surveillance testing | 32

15 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36

16 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39

17 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | TYPE | NA | 41

18 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43

19 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | Y | 44 | Press notified on 8/3/82 | 45

NAME OF PREPARER Bill Williamson

PHONE 205/729-0845

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PDR ADOCK 05000259  
S PDRJEZ  
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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82053-R1 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.C & 4.7.C

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(9) \* Date Due NRC 06/17/83

Event Narrative:

While performing Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.7.C prior to beginning unit 2 refueling operations, secondary containment integrity could not be confirmed. Units 1 and 3 were operating at steady state at 84-percent power. Unit 2 was subcritical and was being placed in cold shutdown for the outage. Results of the SI approached but did not meet technical specification requirements. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.C.2, tests were run on units 1 and 3 and rerun on unit 2. Results were acceptable for all zones except unit 3. Unit 3 was placed in cold shutdown; normal operations were resumed on the other units. Followup testing on unit 3 did not agree with previous results. All zones were retested and failed to meet TS requirements. Unit 2 refueling operations were suspended and primary containment reestablished. Unit 1 was placed in cold shutdown.

A task force was established to investigate the cause of loss of secondary containment and implement corrective action. Testing and investigation were conducted. These investigations revealed several leakage paths into secondary containment: a displaced relief panel in the unit 1 steam tunnel, worn seals for the unit 3 equipment air lock doors, and inadequate sealing around ventilation conduits from the unit 3 480V shutdown board rooms to the reactor building. These leakage paths are from other areas within the plant interior (turbine building, control bay) into the secondary containment. The leakage paths were corrected. The testing procedure for secondary containment was revised. SI 4.7.C was successfully performed three times to prove secondary containment following completion of repairs. SI 4.7.C (Secondary Containment) has been revised to allow for single zone testing once interzone leakage is quantified. The procedure allows both whole building testing (which is not affected by interzone leakage) and individual zone testing, which accounts for adjacent zone ventilation. The most likely cause of the blowout panel dislocation was determined to be either someone pushing the panel ajar for cooling purposes during unit outages or a surge of air pressure that broke the explosion bolts. (Continued on next page)

\* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

\*Revision: JRP

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
BFRO LER 50-259/82053-R1

Event Narrative (Continued)

Maintenance procedures have also been revised. The frequency of performance of MMI-14 (Inspection of Secondary Containment Relief Panels) has been changed so that the blowout panels are now checked at the end of each refueling outage. The damper linkages are periodically inspected throughout the operating cycle. In addition, plant procedures are being further revised to provide for visual inspection of the dampers during the refueling outage. MMI-14 is also being revised to incorporate the inspection of seals in the steam tunnel. It is expected that all appropriate procedure revisions will be completed by June 20, 1983.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

June 15, 1983

83 JUN 16 P 8:57

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  
REPORT BFRC-50-259/82053 - REVISION 1

This enclosed report is a supplement to my letter dated August 19, 1982,  
concerning failure to confirm secondary containment during surveillance  
testing. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry  
unit 1 Technical Specification 6.7.2.a(9).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*H. J. Green*

H. J. Green  
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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Washington, D.C. 20555

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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
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NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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