

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 A L B R F 2 0 C - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

CONT

01 REPORT SOURCE L E 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 7 0 5 2 0 8 3 H 0 6 1 4 8 3 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During normal operation on unit 2, while performing SI 4.1.A-5 (High
03 Reactor Pressure), pressure switch PS-3-22B had an as-found setpoint of
04 1058 psig. Tech. Spec. Table 3.1.A trip level setting is \leq 1055 psig.
05 Pressures above this setpoint cause the switch to input to the scram
06 logic circuits. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public.
07 Redundant switches were available and operable.

08

09 I A 11 E 12 E 13 I N S T R U 14 S 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

17 LOW/HO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21
18 EVENT YEAR 8 3 22
19 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 5 23
20 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 24
21 REPORT TYPE L 25
22 REVISION NO. 0 26
23 ACTION TAKEN E 27
24 FUTURE ACTION X 28
25 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 29
26 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 30
27 HOURS 0 0 0 0 31
28 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 32
29 NPRO-1 FORM SUB. N 33
30 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L 34
31 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 6 9 35

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Pressure switch PS-3-22B calibration had drifted. The Barksdale
11 B2T-A12SS pressure switch was recalibrated, functionally tested and
12 returned to service. See attached action plan for corrective action,
13 category 3.

14

15 E 28 0 9 7 29 N/A 30 B 31 Surveillance Testing 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

18 0 0 0 40 N/A 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

19 Z 42 N/A 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

20 N 44 N/A 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

21 N/A 46
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

22 N/A 47
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

NAME OF PREPARER David C. Goodwin

PHONE (205) 729-0841

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83025 Technical Specification Involved 3.1.A

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC 06/19/83

Event Narrative:

Units 2 and 3 were operating normally at 97 and 99 percent power, respectively. Unit 1 was in an outage. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. During the performance of Surveillance Instruction 4.2.A-5 (High Reactor Pressure), pressure switch PS-3-22B had an as-found setpoint of 1058 psig. Technical Specification Table 3.1.A requires a trip level setting equal to or less than 1055 psig. Pressure above the setpoint trips one trip system of the RPS logic, which in combination with a trip in the other trip system, scrams the reactor. Pressure switch PS-3-22B calibration had drifted. The Barksdale B2TA12SS pressure switch was recalibrated, functionally tested and returned to service. Redundant switches were available and operable. See attached action plan for corrective action, category 3. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-260/79017, 80020

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

Revision: JRP

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 JUN 16 P 8:59

June 14, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83025

The enclosed report provides details concerning a high reactor pressure
switch that experienced a setpoint drift. This report is submitted in
accordance with Browns Ferry unit 2 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
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Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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