



DUKE POWER COMPANY

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HAL B. TUCKER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

June 10, 1983

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/83-06. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker / HBT*

Hal B. Tucker

JCP/php  
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Mr. J. C. Bryant  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
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Washington, D. C. 20555

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Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-287/83-06

Report Date: June 10, 1983

Occurrence Date: May 13, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Unit 3 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFDWP) was made inoperable when power was lost to the Auxiliary Oil Pump impairing automatic initiation of the TDEFDWP.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On May 13, 1983, at 0547, during a repair attempt to replace a cell in the 3PB battery, the 3PB power battery breaker was opened without first cross-tying the power battery buses. As a result, the 3PB bus, which supplies power to the Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump, lost power when the breaker was opened. With no power to this pump, the TDEFDWP will not automatically start upon an initiation signal. Therefore, the TDEFDWP was technically inoperable when the auxiliary oil pump was out of service (see RO-269/82-20 for a similar incident). This constituted a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.4.2.b, which states that one TDEFDWP may be inoperable for a period of up to 72 hours. The TDEFDWP was inoperable for 81 seconds.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident was personnel error. The person performing the repair work forgot to perform a procedural step that contained instructions to cross-connect the buses prior to isolating the 3PB battery. The person was qualified to perform this procedure and had previously observed the proper method of isolating a power battery.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the period of inoperability, both of the motor-driven EFDW pumps were operable. Per Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 10.4.7.1 only 500 gpm of emergency feedwater are required as a minimum to enable safe and orderly cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. If emergency feedwater had been required, the motor-driven pumps could have supplied the water. Also, the TDEFDW pump was returned to service within 2 minutes, well within the time permitted by Technical Specification 3.4.2. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: Upon loss of indication to the 3PB bus, Control Room personnel contacted the person performing the repair work, who immediately restored power by closing the 3PB power battery breaker. This was done within 81 seconds, and returned the TDEFDWP to operability.

The person involved has been counseled concerning his failure to follow the correct procedural steps.