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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 92717

June 16th, 1983

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
Chief, Standardization and Special Projects Branch,  
Division of Licensing,  
Washington D.C. 20555

Re: Docket 50-326, License R-116  
Incident Report for June 2nd, 1983  
Reported under Tech. Specs:  
6.7.c.3.  
(abnormal occurrence)

Gentlemen,

On June 2nd, 1983 the fast transient control rod (FTR) failed to return completely to core following a manual scram. The scram was at the end of a core excess check operation, following maintenance activities involving the air supplies to the transient rods (cleaning of air filter trap). This activity had involved successive "firing" of the FTR several times, to remove air pressure from the system. Operations were suspended until the Reactor Supervisor was able to inspect the system on the following day.

Inspection of the rod drive system revealed that the interior of the air cylinder was somewhat dry. A few drops of light oil were added and the rod drive fired several times. Successful reinsertion into core was obtained. As a final check, rod drop times were carefully determined and found to be in complete agreement with values obtained on prior occasions during 6-month tests.

Inspection of maintenance records indicated no reference to the annual maintenance of "placing a few drops of light oil into the air cylinder for the FTR" during the previous annual maintenance cycle completed in January, 1983. As a result of personnel changes in 1982, this item was overlooked, and had not been placed as an individual item on any check list. The check list had a general entry for FTR drive maintenance.

As a result of this occurrence, officially classified as an "abnormal occurrence" according to Tech Specs 1.13 for this facility, we are undertaking a complete review of our maintenance checklists, and are revising them. In addition, any items found to have been overlooked, or for which no clear record is apparent, will be repeated now to get them back in order, and will be performed again in the January cycle. This activity, because of summer vacations, etc, and the need for fairly extensive revision of checklists, and some procedural documents, is expected to take until mid-September for completion.

It must be emphasized that this incident in itself did not have any significant safety aspects. The FTR is only worth approximately \$0.65 reactivity because of its core location. Its function is therefore not essential to assuring the safe shut-down of the UCI reactor, since a wide margin over available excess reactivity is provided by the other control rods.

Sincerely yours,

cc: NRC Region V  
W. Lillyman, The Vice Chancellor  
V. Guinn, Chair, ROC  
Members, ROC  
P. Rogers, SRO

*G. E. Miller*  
George E. Miller, Reactor Supervisor

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