

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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**CP&L**

Carolina Power & Light Company

USNRC REGION I  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, NC 28461-0429

June 10, 1983

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
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street N.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-324  
LICENSE NO. DPR-62  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-83-47

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.9b of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/dj/LETDJ4

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung  
NRC Document Control Desk

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LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-83-47

Facility: Unit No. 2

Event Date: May 13, 1983

While performing a supervisory technical review of the completed test procedure for Fire Suppression Water System valve operability test, PT-35.22, the duty Shift Operating Supervisor determined two system valves, 2-MUD-V37 and 2-FP-V58, were not covered in the test procedure. Following this discovery the PT was temporarily revised to provide for required testing of the valves and both valves were satisfactorily tested.

An investigation of this surveillance procedure deficiency revealed that an August through September 1982 review of all Fire Protection System valves for applicability to Technical Specification 4.7.7.1.d had determined the subject valves did not require the once per 12 months surveillance testing outlined in the specification. This determination was based on the fact that the subject valves were not considered part of the normal Fire Suppression System flow path. Of these valves, 2-MUD-V37 is the makeup demineralized water (MUD) tank cross-tie to the Fire Suppression System while the other valve, 2-FP-V58, is the Fire Suppression System emergency suction isolation cross-tie in series with 2-MUD-V37. The investigation concluded that the personnel who performed the subject August through September 1982 review failed to consider Technical Specifications 3.7.7.1.b and c, which identify the MUD tank as part of the required operable flow path for the Fire Suppression System.

As a result of this event, a permanent revision to PT-35.22 will be made by June 30, 1983, to provide for required testing of the subject valves. In addition, a review of the Fire Suppression System flow path valves is presently in progress to ensure that system valves which require surveillance testing pursuant to Technical Specification 3.7.7.1.c are covered by appropriate plant procedures. The expected completion date of this review is June 15, 1983, with any needed procedure changes identified by the review to follow.