

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CAR 1451

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 N Y R E G 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 0 5 0 1 8 3 8 0 5 3 1 8 3 9
8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On May 1, 1983 at 2250 hours while at Cold Shutdown, the "A" and "B" RHR pumps were
03 running ("B" pump started at 2109 hours) and taking suction from the Refueling Water
04 Storage Tank (RWST) for filling the Reactor Refueling Cavity in preparation for
05 Refueling operations. The RWST level had decreased to 20% level which required by
06 procedure to stop one RHR pump. The "A" RHR pump was stopped and flow dropped to
07 zero. Control Room Operator noticed MOV-704B ("B" RHR pump suction valve) closed.
08 The "A" RHR pump was restarted and flow re-established and the "B" RHR pump stopped.

09 SYSTEM CODE C F 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE X 13 COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14 COMP. SUBCODE E 15 VALVE SUBCODE D 16 (Continued on next page)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 7 24 25 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 29 REPORT TYPE L 30 31 REVISION NO. 0 32
ACTION TAKEN H 18 G 19 FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER P 1 1 2 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 On April 27, 1983, MCC D was out of service to inspect MCC D circuit breaker on Bus
11 16 using M-37.1. The motor control center's breaker was held between 0700 and 0957
12 but the control power fuses were still in place on MCC D breakers. During this time
13 an attempt was made to stroke MOV-704B per steps 6.18.2.4 and 6.18.3.4 of PT-2.3 by
14 Test and Results Personnel. PT-2.3 was an on-going procedure that was started

15 FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator observation 32 (Continued on next page)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
16 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE 0 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
20 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION N/A 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NAME OF PREPARED G.F. Larizza

PHONE 315/524-4446 Ext. 255

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (cont'd)

Thus for a period of less than two hours while filling the Reactor Cavity the "B" RHR pump was run with its suction valve closed. The Auxiliary Operator checked "B" RHR pump and found it warm but no seal leakage. The pump was tested for flow and vibration with conditions found normal.

This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1.e.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

4/13/83.

Because the power was off MCC D and the control power fuses to its breakers still in place, when the attempt was made to stroke MOV-704B to see if temporary power had been supplied to this breaker the valve position status lights did not change therefore no entry was made in the Official Log or in PT-2.3. It should be noted that prior to this event the line-ups were in proper conditions.

If the power is not on to a MOV Breaker but its control power fuses are still in place and an attempt is made to close this valve, the valve will not move but the signal to move will still be there even if the switch has been placed in the Open position. When the power is restored to this breaker, the valve will then close. This is what happened to MOV-704B. When the power was restored to MCC D the valve went closed because a close signal was still present. This event went un-noticed by the Operators, therefore, on 5/1/83 at 2109 when the "B" RHR pump was started to flood the refueling cavity, its suction valve was still closed.

A change of procedure has been submitted to O-6.13, "Daily Surveillance Log" to add the valves necessary to RHR operation while at Cold Shutdown to the check sheet and to allow the requirement to perform the valve position status checks performed during operation (step 5.9) to be N/A'd because many of these valves are not in the position called for.

Electrical Foreman has changed procedures M-44.3 and M-44.4 "Isolation of 1C MCC & 1D MCC and Restarting it to Service" respectively, so that after maintenance has been completed and just prior to returning A.C. Power to the motor control center, the D.C. Control Power to the motor control center will be removed and then returned. This will reset all equipment on the MCC to an as is status.



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JOHN E. MAIER
Vice President

May 31, 1983

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AREA CODE 716 546-2700

Mr. James M. Allan, Acting Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject: LER 83-017/03L, Inoperable Residual Heat Removal Loop.
RHR Suction Valve Closed While RHR Pump In Operation.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Allan:

In accordance with Technical Specification, article 6.9.2.b(3)
"Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative
or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of
degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems
or engineered safety feature systems", the attached Licensee
Event Report LER 83-017/03L-0 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,


John E. Maier

JEM/kdg

Att.

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