


Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444



Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

February 23, 1983
GM-83-180

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
USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Special Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to section 5.7.2 of Hatch Environmental Technical
Specifications, please find attached Special Report No.
50-321/1983-001.


for H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/SBT/abb

xc: R. J. Kelly
G. F. Head
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
S. B. Tipps
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document Control

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NARRATIVE FOR SPECIAL REPORT

50-321/1983-001

On February 13, 1983, with Unit 1 shutdown for refueling, approximately 3000 gallons of 21% glycol spilled onto the floor of the offgas building. The glycol was subsequently mixed with approximately 47,000 gallons of water in radwaste. After notification to and approval of the state Environmental Protection Division, this mixture was discharged to the river in five separate batches on February 13 and February 14. The glycol mixture was further diluted with water in each discharge batch. The discharge batches had an average glycol mixture flowrate of 74.8 gallons per minute and an average dilution flowrate (water) of 12,100 gallons per minute. This event is contrary to Environmental Tech. Specs. section 4.2. Plant operation was not affected. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

The cause of this event has been attributed to an oversight on a clearance of an offgas cooler condenser relief valve. On February 8, a clearance request submitted by maintenance to operations to isolate several valves on the offgas side of the "B" offgas cooler condenser failed to properly isolate the "B" relief valve. A continuation line (on the offgas system piping and instrument drawing) that connected the "B" relief valve with the tube side (glycol side) of the condenser was overlooked.

This oversight caused personnel to believe that the "B" relief valve came off of the shell side (offgas side of the condenser.) When maintenance physically checked the clearance, the "B" relief valve appeared to be isolated. This appearance of isolation existed because the glycol suction and discharge valves to the condenser were closed (but not isolated correctly) at this time. The relief valve was removed from the system to be worked on. On February 12, a clearance was requested on the "A" valve. On February 13, the control room switched from the "A" loop pump to the "B" loop pump, and thus opened the "B" loop glycol suction and discharge valves for the offgas cooler condenser. Since the "B" loop was open because the relief valve was out of the system, glycol spilled onto the floor. Affected site personnel have been reminded of the importance of carefully checking valve clearances.