

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 At approximately 4:30 pm on May 20, 1983, a pinhole leak was discovered on the

0 3 Reactor continuous head vent line, 1-0214-2"-B. The leak was identified to be in a

0 4 coupling-to-pipe weld. Reactor shutdown continued until 6:18 AM on May 21, 1983, when

0 5 the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition. The consequences of this occurrence

0 6 are minimal since all leakage was contained within the drywell. Plus sufficient

0 7 monitoring of unidentified leakage had been continually maintained within Technical

0 8 Specification 3.6.D.1 allowable limits.

0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

SYSTEM CODE: C J 11
CAUSE CODE: E 12
CAUSE SUBCODE: B 13
COMPONENT CODE: P I P E X X 14
COMP SUBCODE: A 15
VALVE SUBCODE: Z 16
EVENT YEAR: 83
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 021
OCCURRENCE CODE: 01
REPORT TYPE: T
REVISION NO.: 0
ACTION TAKEN: B 18
FUTURE ACTION: Z 19
EFFECT ON PLANT: Z 20
SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z 21
HOURS: 0000
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y 23
NPR-4 FORM SUB: N 24
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N 25
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9999 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The probable cause of the pinhole leak has been determined to be slag entrapment

1 1 within the weld during initial installation. This weld was originally surface

1 2 examined which would not have identified this problem. The indication was removed

1 3 and rewelded. A magnetic particle test and a visual examination were then performed

1 4 and no indications were discovered. An operational hydrostatic test was successfully

1 5 completed during start-up.

1 5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

FACILITY STATUS: D 28
% POWER: 033 29
OTHER STATUS: NA 30
METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C 31
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Drywell Inspection 32
ACTIVITY CONTENT: Z 33
RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z 34
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 35
LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 36

1 6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: 000 37
TYPE: Z 38
DESCRIPTION: NA 39

1 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PERSONNEL INJURIES: 000 40
DESCRIPTION: NA 41

1 8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: Z 42
TYPE: NA 43

1 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PUBLICITY: N 44
DESCRIPTION: NA 45

2 0 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ISSUED: N 44
DESCRIPTION: NA 45

8306130329 830601
PDR ADOCK 05000254
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER: G. Tietz

PHONE: 309-654-2241 ext. 243



Commonwealth Edison

DEVIATION REPORT

DVR NO. 4 - 1 - 83 - 47
STA UNIT YEAR NO.

PART 1 TITLE OF DEVIATION

OCCURRED

5-20-83

4:30p.m.

DATE

TIME

Pinhole leak in continuous head vent line 1-214-2"-B

A AFFECTED

200

PLANT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

MODE RUN

PWR(MWT)

826

LOAD(MWE)

246

TESTING

YES

NO

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

While performing a general inspection of the Drywell prior to a preventative maintenance outage, a pinhole leak was discovered in a coupling-to-pipe weld on line 1-0214-2"-B.

This is a carbon steel pipe, ASTM A106 Gr B schedule 80.

10 CFR50.72 NRC RED PHONE

☐☒

NOTIFICATION MADE

YES

NO

EQUIPMENT FAILURE Q26302

☒ YES☐ NO

WORK REQUEST NO.

RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR

G. Tietz

DATE 5-21-83

PART 2 OPERATING ENGINEER'S COMMENTS

Weld repair to be completed prior to unit startup.

☐ EVENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST☐ TECH. SPEC. VIOLATION☐ NON REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE☒ 14 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S. 6.6.B.1.c.☐ 30 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S.☐ ANNUAL/SPECL REPORT REQ'D☒ 24-HOUR NRC NOTIFICATION REQ'D

TELEPH N. Chrissotimos

5-20-83

1630

REGION III

DATE

TIME

TELEGM/TELECOPY J. Keppler

5-23-83

0830

REGION III

DATE

TIME

☐ CECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE

IF ABOVE NOTIFICATION IS PER 10CFR21

☐ 5-DAY WRITTEN REPORT REQ'D PER 10CFR21

TELEPH

CECO CORPORATE OFFICER

DATE

TIME

PRELIMINARY REPORT
COMPLETED AND REVIEWED

Gary Spedl

5-24-83

OPERATING ENGINEER

DATE

INVESTIGATED REPORT & RESOLUTION
APPROVED BY STATION REVIEW

G.C. Tietz

[Signature]

[Signature]

RESOLUTION APPROVED AND
AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION

STATION SUPERINTENDENT

DATE

6/1/83



Commonwealth Edison
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
22710 206 Avenue North
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241

DMB

NJK-83-197

June 1, 1983

J. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137


Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One
Appendix A, Section 6.6.B.1.C

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report Number RO 83-21/01T-0 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telephone on May 20, 1983 and by telecopy on May 23, 1983.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.C., an abnormal degradation discovered in a reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK:GCT/lfd

Enclosures

cc: B. Rybak
N. Chrissotimos
INPO-Records Center

JUN 6 1983

FE22

- I. LER Number - LER/RO 83-21/01T-0
- II. Licensee Name - Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. Facility Name - Unit One
- IV. Docket Number - 050-254
- V. Event Description -

On May 20, 1983 at approximately 4:30 p.m., preparations for a preventative maintenance outage were under way when a drywell inspection revealed a pinhole leak on a pipe-to-coupling weld located on the continuous head vent line, 1-0214-2"-B. Reactor load was being held at 246 MWe while surveillance testing was being performed. By 6:18 a.m. on May 21, 1983 the Unit was brought to a cold shutdown condition to repair the weld. The head vent line is a carbon steel 2" pipe, type ASTM A106 Grade B, Schedule 80; and the coupling is a carbon steel type A105, 3000# WOG fitting. Containment leakage monitoring had shown the magnitude of the leak to be well within Technical Specification 3.6.D.1 limit of 5 gpm for unidentified leakage.

VI. Probable Consequences of the Occurrence

The consequences of this occurrence are minimal due to the fact that all leakage was contained within the drywell. Sufficient monitoring of unidentified leakage had been continually maintained; therefore, had the leak increased in size, proper action would have been initiated to correct the situation.

The containment air samples did not indicate unusually high activity levels; therefore, no radioactive release was apparent due to this occurrence.

The purpose of the continuous head vent line is to vent non-condensable gases from the reactor head space. The pinhole leak did not affect the ability of this line to perform its function. Any small amount of gases which may have been vented to the drywell was properly sampled and vented in accordance with the proper regulations.

VII. Cause

The most probable cause of the pinhole leak is attributed to slag entrapment within the weld which was left from original construction. The numerous thermal cycles of this line caused this void to work through to the surface. Since this weld was visually inspected during installation, it would not have been identified as an indication.

VIII. Corrective Action

Following a shutdown of the reactor, the weld was repaired in accordance with a repair program written to ASME Section XI, IWA-4000 1980 edition, Winter 1981 addenda. The affected area was excavated, and the area was dye penetrant tested. No indications were evident and the excavation was rewelded. A magnetic particle test and a visual examination were then performed, and no indications were found. The line was also pressure tested at normal operating pressure during start-up on May 23, 1983. No abnormalities were evident during this inspection at operating pressure.