

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT 1

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 0 1 8
9 A R A N O 2 12
14 LICENSEE CODE 15 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 13
25 26 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 15
7 0 1 8
16 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 8 17
68 DOCKET NUMBER 69 0 2 1 6 8 3 18
74 75 0 6 0 2 1 3 19
80 REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

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[0][2] | With the reactor at approximately 6% full power during a routine start-up on 2/16/83, fires were discovered at
[0][3] | the auto transformer connection and at the oil circuit breaker connection of the 22kv supply line to start-up
[0][4] | transformer #3. On 5/7/83, with the unit at 100% power, an auto transformer ground fault and overheated
[0][5] | connection on "A" phase of start-up transformer #3 were detected. Start-up transformer #3 was removed from
[0][6] | service to repair an electrical breakdown of the insulation of the "C" phase power cable at the point it
[0][7] | enters the pothead. These events caused one offsite power supply to Unit 2 to be temporarily inoperable. In
[0][8] | both instances, start-up transformer #2 and both emergency diesel generators remained operable. There have
7 8 9

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		REVISION NO	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
0	9	E	B	E	12	A	13	X	X	Z	15	Z	16
7	8	9	10	11	12	12	13	13	14	15	16	17	18
LER/RO		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO			
17	REPORT NUMBER	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
1	A	1	X	1	Z	1	Z	1	Y	1	Y	1	A
18	18	19	19	20	20	21	21	22	22	23	23	24	24
33	33	34	34	35	35	36	36	37	37	38	38	39	39
HOURS		ATTACHMENT		NPRD-4		PRIME COMP.		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
40	40	41	41	42	42	43	43	44	44	45	45	46	46
47	47	48	48	49	49	50	50	51	51	52	52	53	53

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27	
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4

The 2/16/83 event was caused by the failure of the connection of the supply line to the transformer due to
 air being trapped in the potting mixture at the time of the original connection. The fire at the breaker
 connection of the supply line was judged to be a result of the failure of the transformer connection because
 evidence of less heat was apparent at the breaker connection. Immediate actions for the first occurrence were
 to dispatch the fire brigade, trip the reactor, shift loads to start-up transformer #2 and de-energize the

FACILITY STATUS						% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1	5	E	1	0	0	NA	A		Operator Observation

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
1 1 6 1 7 8	2 133	1 NA	135 NA
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES	10 134	44 45	136

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES			44	45	80
NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION			
1	7	NA			
7	8				
9	11				
12	13				
					39

PERSONNEL INJURIES											80
NUMBER					DESCRIPTION						
1	1	8	1	0	0	0	1	40	NA		
7			8	9			11	12			41

11 12		142
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		80
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1 9 1	1 D 142 <u>Connections on 22kv supply line to start-up transformer #3 ruined</u>	142

PUBLICITY							
ISSUED				DESCRIPTION			
7	2	0	8	N	44	NA	
9			10				

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

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8306130270 830602
PDR ADCK 05000368
S PDR

IE22

LER No. 50-368/83-010/03X-1

Occurrence Date: 2/16/83

Event Description and Probable Consequences (Continued):

been no similar occurrences. These events are reportable per Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued):


transformer. Corrective action was to replace the two failed connections and to visually inspect other connections. Because no other connections showed evidence of problems when originally inspected and because this was considered to be an isolated incident, no future action was planned. However, regarding the 5/7/83 event, further investigations revealed that the "C" phase power cable exhibited insulation breakdown at the point the cable entered the pothead. The pothead was replaced and similar potheads and cables were tested to assure they were within specification. This event is being investigated further to determine if additional corrective action is required.



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June 2, 1983

2CAN068303

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Reactor Project Branch #2
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
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


Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6
Licensee Event Report
No. 83-010/03X-1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b, attached is the subject report concerning the discovery of fires at the auto transformer connection and the oil circuit breaker connection to startup transformer #3. This is a revision to a previous submittal dated March 17, 1983.

Very truly yours,


John R. Marshall
Manager, Licensing

JRM:RJS:s1

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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