



SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

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O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

June 3, 1983

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USNRC REGION 3  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 83-040

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-040 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(c) as a result of entry into Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.7.6, "Control Room Normal and Emergency Air Handling System," on May 6, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

RJB:OWD/dwf  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer  
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
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#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

On May 5, 1983, at 1810 hours, with the Plant in Mode 5, Control Room Ventilation "A" Train was declared operable after performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 124.002, "Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System Performance Test". A review of the associated test data on May 6, 1983, revealed that the System Functional Test for "A" Train had not been performed to satisfy operability requirements.

Prior to the aforementioned finding associated with the test data, at 1910 hours, May 5, 1983, Control Room Ventilation "B" Train was tagged out to support charcoal filter replacement. This action rendered both Control Room Ventilation Systems inoperable.

Additional "A" Train testing was performed, and the system was declared operable at 2150 hours May 6, 1983. The total time which both ventilation systems were inoperable was 26 hours and 40 minutes.

Two (2) independent control room normal and emergency air handling systems are required by Technical Specification 3.7.6 in all modes. As a result of both trains being declared inoperable, Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.7.6 was applicable.

There were no adverse consequences due to this event. During the period that both ventilation trains were inoperable, the reactor was shut down by greater than 2.0% delta k/k, no core alterations were made, and there were no positive reactivity changes made.

#### CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of this event was due to failure in implementing procedural controls. Personnel involved in the testing were counselled on the importance of completing procedures to determine system operability.