



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 8640 JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

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JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

June 6, 1983

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket No. 50-416/417
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/15525/15526/16694.4
PRD-83/06, Final Report,
Carbon Steel Instrument Air
Penetration
AECM-83/0324

Reference: AECM-83/0179, 3/15/83

On March 15, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F. Cantrell, of your office, of a deficiency at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the installation of non-corrosion resistant material for instrument air pipe penetrations.

MP&L has evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 for Unit 1 and is not reportable for Unit 2.

Details are provided in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

ACP:dr
ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
NRC

AECM-83/0324
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cc: Mr. J. B. Richard
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-83/06

1. Name and address of the individual ... informing the commission:

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
Vice-President, Nuclear
P.O. Box 1640
Jackson, Mississippi 39205

2. Identification of the facility ... which ... contains a deficiency:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Unit 1
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

3. Identification of the firm ... supplying the basic component which ... contains a deficiency:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by the Bechtel Power Corporation in
Gaithersburg, Maryland.

4. Nature of the deficiency ... and the safety hazard which ... could be created by such a deficiency ...:

A. Description of the Deficiency

The deficiency concerns the failure of the A/E to provide corrosion resistant materials downstream of the filters in the instrument air supply to the MSIV's and safety/relief valves as required by the GE specification. Carbon steel piping and valves were installed, by the A/E, downstream of the final filtering of the air supply to the MSIV's and safety/relief valve operators.

B. Analysis of Safety Implications

The existence of carbon steel piping and components downstream of the final filters could, over a period of time, induce corrosion products into the instrument air system. As an example, these corrosion products could prevent the required movement of the solenoid valves associated with the MSIV's. Failure of the solenoid valves to change position, when required, during a steam line break would prevent closure of the MSIV's. This could lead to exceeding the limits of 10CFR100, during the accident, when the MSIV's are required to close.

5. The date on which the information of such deficiency ... was obtained.

Mississippi Power & Light received information of the deficiency on January 18, 1983. We reported the deficiency to Mr. F. Cantrell, of your office, as being reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 for Unit 1 and potentially reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for Unit 2, on March 15, 1983. An evaluation for Part 21 has been completed and the MP&L "Responsible Officer," Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr., has been notified.

6. In the case of the basic component ... the number and location of all such components.

The carbon steel piping and valves are located at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

This deficiency, as it applies to Unit 2, is being tracked by our A/E's tracking document QAR-F-385. As far as 10CFR reportability is concerned Part 21 does not apply in that the Unit 2 system has yet to be installed and consequently has not been turned over to MP&L.

This is a plant specific design and, we have no knowledge of such deficiencies other than at GGNS.

7. The corrective action which has been taken ... the name of the individual ... responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been ... taken to complete the action.

A. Corrective Actions Taken

MP&L is in the process of preparing and evaluating a Design Change Package that will correct the subject deficiency. DCP-82/817 consists of replacing piping, valves, and the installation of filters on the air supply to the MSIV's and Safety/Relief valves. As a part of DCP-82/817, MP&L will conduct air blows downstream of the installed filters to remove any particulates which may be in the lines.

The ADS receivers and MSIV and Safety/Relief Valve accumulators are constructed of coated carbon steel. In addition to the above, MP&L plans to conduct periodic sampling of the air from the receivers and accumulators. This sampling will assure the effectiveness of the internal coatings.

MP&L has determined that the cause of the deficiency was due to the failure of the A/E to strictly adhere to the GE specification.

Bechtel Project Engineering determined that the deficiency cited in PRD-83/06 would not have occurred on Unit 2 in that all Unit 1 DCPs are being screened for the purpose of identifying significant Unit 1/Unit 2 design divergence. DCP-82/817 was generated by Unit 1 to correct the noted deficiency and upon Unit 2 review the package would have been determined necessary for implementation on Unit 2. Therefore, this condition is not considered as a Unit 2 deficiency under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

B. Responsible Individual

C. K. McCoy
Plant Manager
Mississippi Power & Light Co.
Responsible for Unit 1

T. H. Cloninger
Unit 2 Project Manager
Mississippi Power & Light Co.
Responsible for Unit 2

C. Length of Time to Complete Actions

For Unit 1, MP&L expects to complete DCP-82/817 prior to nuclear heatup.

Even though this deficiency is not considered reportable for Unit 2, Bechtel Project Engineering will revise P&ID drawings M-2067A, M-2067B and M-2067C to show the proper material and review the entire Unit 2 Instrument Air System. These actions are scheduled to be completed by August 15, 1983.

8. Any advice related to the deficiency ... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to offer.