

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

1 With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, PT-27D revealed that amp readings for heat tracing  
2 Panels 8, circuit 13C was below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. This  
3 event is contrary to T.S.3.3.A.4 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). The  
4 redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, therefore, the health and safety of  
5 the public were not affected.  
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## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat. The defective heat tracing was  
2 replaced and tested. A design change has been prepared to change the manner by  
3 which these borated lines are heat traced. Installation of this design change has  
4 commenced.  
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8306100186 830603  
 PDR ADOCK 05000281  
 S PDR

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

PHONE (804) 357-3184

JE22

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO: 50-281  
REPORT NO: 83-024/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 05-17-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. Description of the Event

With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, PT-27D revealed that the amp readings for heat tracing panel 8, circuit 13C (BIT recirc. to "C" BAST) was below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.A.4 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The heat tracing circuits are intended to maintain a fluid temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuits were operable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The defective heat tracing tape was replaced and tested within the time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No additional actions were deemed necessary.

7. Generic Implications

A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the heat tracing system and a Design Change has been prepared as a result of the Task Force Study. The Design Change has been completed on Unit 1 CVCS. Unit 2 CVCS will be completed during the forthcoming refueling outage.

# Vepco

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 JUN 7 9:28  
JUN 3 1983

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

Surry Power Station  
P. O. Box 315  
Surry, Virginia 23883

Serial No: 83-041

Docket No: 50-281

License No: DPR-37

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 2.

Report Number


Applicable Technical Specification

83-024/03L-0

T. S. 6.6.2.b(2)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

  
J. L. Wilson  
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk, USNRC  
016 Phillips Bldg.  
Washington, D. C. 20555

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL

Certified By enb

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