



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

P. O. Box 10429

Southport, NC 28461-0429

June 3, 1983

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USNRC REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-324

LICENSE NO. DPR-62

SPECIAL 14-DAY REPORT PER APPENDIX B SPECIFICATION 3.5.2h

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

At 1230 on May 21, 1983, with Unit No. 2 at power operation, a plant Engineer involved with installing the charcoal adsorber bed modification in the Augmented Off-Gas (AOG) Building discovered that electrical panels HB5 and HB8 in the building were deenergized. Following this discovery and notification to the Control Room, a duty plant Operations Auxiliary Operator was dispatched to the subject electrical panels, and HB5 and HB8 were subsequently reenergized at 1247 on May 21, 1983.

An investigation of this event was begun by the plant Operations Shift Foreman, with assistance provided by the responsible Unit No. 2 Operations Engineer, the responsible Operations Off-Gas System Startup Engineer, and the responsible Construction Electrical Coordinator for the AOG charcoal adsorber modification. At 1400 on May 21, 1983, it was determined that the solenoid operator power supply for 2-AOG-HCV-102, Unit No. 2 off-gas isolation valve, is fed from the subject electrical panels.

Valve 2-AOG-HCV-102 is the Unit No. 2 off-gas isolation to the plant stack. This valve is required to be operable in plant operating modes 1, 2, and 3 and receives an automatic isolation signal from the unit's main condenser steam jet air ejector radiation monitors. The valve is air operated and closed when the actuating solenoid is energized. The HCV-102 valve position indication is energized from a power source separate from the valve's actuating solenoid. As a result, when the solenoid power supply was deenergized, normal valve position indication was not affected, and there was no indication on the control board that the valve was rendered incapable of automatic or manual isolation.

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Investigation of this event revealed the following:

1. Plant licensed personnel were not aware that position indication for 2-AOG-HCV-102 is fed from a power source separate from that which feeds the actuating solenoid.
2. Plant drawings relative to the HCV-102 valve logic and position indication were not readily available in the Control Room files. Neither the available premodification nor the postmodification plant drawings reflected the actual configuration of the subject panels at the time of the event. Staff personnel who were aware of the panel's configuration or could have assisted in making a more timely determination of the HCV-102 inoperability were not available on site with the exception of one Startup Engineer.
3. Due to the major modification work in progress in the AOG Building, the status of the subject electrical panels was not immediately known to the Operations Shift Foreman. These panels were accessible to large numbers of involved Construction and test personnel for actuation of modification-related electrical breakers.
4. Basic ground rules by which test and Construction people may operate equipment in the plant were not well understood at the time of the discovery.

The following corrective actions have been or will be taken to preclude future similar events:

1. A security guard was stationed at the panels to ensure only authorized personnel have access to the panels. On May 26, 1983, the stationed security guard was discontinued when the electrical panels HB5 and HB8 were locked with plant Operations key locks.
2. Memorandums to the plant management group and plant Engineering startup/Construction personnel, outlining guidelines concerning the operation of plant equipment, were distributed on May 12 and May 23, 1983.
3. An appropriate plant modification will be developed and implemented to provide that position indication of 2-AOG-HCV-102 be powered from the same power supply circuit as the valve air operator solenoid.
4. A review of the power supply logic drawings of plant safety-related valves will be performed to determine if additional modifications or controls are necessary due to other logic supply power versus indication power supply differences.


Mr. O'Reilly

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5. Efforts to update plant drawings to reflect present as-built conditions will continue.
6. An outside contract special investigator was brought in to determine the individual(s) involved in the unauthorized opening of the HB5 and HB8 breakers.
7. A supplemental report shall establish commitment dates for performance of Items 3 and 4 and report the results of the investigation in Item 6.

Per discussions with Mr. C. W. Hehl of your office, this report is being submitted one day beyond the 14-day time requirement for special reports per the Appendix B Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/shb/LETGC4

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk