

EXPIRES 4-30-82

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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

June 3, 1983

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USNRC REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Fourteen Day Written Report
LER 83-041

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-041 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Fourteen Day Report is being submitted as a result of noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.0.4 on May 18, 1983.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

RJB:OWD/dwf
Attachment

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

Technical Specification 3.5.4.2 requires that two (2) independent channels of heat tracing be operable for the boron injection tank and for the heat traced portion of the associated flow path in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Specification 3.0.4 is applicable. On May 1, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 5, Train B heat tracing was deenergized to prevent boiling in the system with the recirculation pumps out of service. On May 8, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 5, SOP-112 ("Safety Injection System") alignment was performed.

On May 17, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 4, Train B heat tracing was identified by Operations personnel as being deenergized. However, no corrective action was taken to identify this as a mode restraining item.

On May 18, 1983, the Plant entered Mode 3 with Train B of heat tracing deenergized, thus, violating Specification 3.0.4. The aforementioned condition was recognized at 0430 hours May 20, 1983, and the panel was energized at 0445 hours. The applicable Surveillance Test Procedure was satisfactorily completed, and the unit declared operable at 0615 hours May 20, 1983.

There were no adverse consequences due to this event. During this period one train of heat tracing was operable. Surveillance of the tank and associated flow path temperatures was made at least once every eight (8) hours and temperatures were maintained above 145°F.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of this event is attributed to personnel error and an inadequate procedure.

Station Administrative Procedure (SAP-205), "System Status and Equipment Removal and Restoration to Service," is implemented if a system or component is required in the existing mode. The subject heat tracing is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Technical Specification 3.5.4), therefore, the deenergizing of the heat tracing system was not documented in the Removal and Restoration (R&R) Log. Additional system status controls are implemented to ensure that systems/components are properly aligned prior to mode changes.

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CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Continued

At the Nuclear Operations Supervisory Meeting, April 29, 1983, R&R status was discussed, and direction was given to start tracking all mode restraining items in the R&R log in preparation of coming out of the outage.

System Operating Procedures (SOP's) and their associated attachments are the controlling documents for ensuring a system or component is initially aligned to perform its safety function. The electrical alignment checklist of SOP-112 ("Safety Injection System") was inadequate in that it failed to require verification of the position of the main power breaker in the local control panel. This procedure deficiency prevented the system misalignment from being corrected or identified on the electrical alignment sheet.

A System Status file is maintained which contains the most recently performed SOP Valve Lineup Sheet, Electrical Lineup Sheet, Instrument Alignment Sheet, and Control Panel Lineup Sheet, as applicable. The SOP's are filed by the System and the most recent General Operating Procedures (GOP's) are filed by number. Any change in the System Status from the SOP or GOP designated lineup shall be documented in the System Status file by a copy of the document that controlled the change.

General Operating Procedures (GOP's) direct plant evolutions during startup and shutdown which require changing system or component alignments. These GOP's require system status verification prior to mode changes.

The power availability to the heat tracing cabinet is monitored once per eight (8) hours and is documented on the operators log. However, this was not identified as a Technical Specification item on the log sheet.

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CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Continued

Corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence are:

1. SOP-112, "Safety Injection System," is being revised to include the main power breaker located in the local control panel for the heat tracing system. This action should be completed by June 30, 1983.
2. The operator logs have been revised to identify the power availability to the heat trace panel as a Technical Specification item. The logs are being revised to establish separate logs for Technical Specification items and non-Technical Specification items. This action should be completed by June 30, 1983.
3. The responsible Shift Supervisor, who identified the B Train heat tracing as being deenergized on May 17, 1983, was counseled on failure to enter the item in the Removal and Restoration Log.