

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE

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DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

0 2 (NP-33-83-29) On 5/2/83 at 0830 hours, an operator found the Fuel Handling Access

0 3 Corridor Door 406 ajar. Since this door is a fire and a negative pressure boundary

0 4 door, the unit entered the action statement of Technical Specifications 3.7.10 and

0 5 3.9.12. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station per-

0 6 sonnel. Smoke detectors are located on both sides of door 406 and would have provided

0 7 adequate warning had a fire occurred in the area.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| 08 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | SYSTEM CODE | | CAUSE CODE | | CAUSE SUBCODE | | COMPONENT CODE | | | | | | COMP SUBCODE | | VALVE SUBCODE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 0 | | 9 | | 7 | | 8 | | A | | B | | 11 | | E | | 12 | | B | | 13 | | Z | | | | | | Z | | 14 | | Z | | 15 | | Z | | 16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | 11 | | 12 | | 13 | | 18 | | | | | | 19 | | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | | EVENT YEAR | | 21 | | 22 | | 23 | | 24 | | 25 | | 26 | | 27 | | 28 | | 29 | | 30 | | 31 | | 32 | | 33 | | 34 | | 35 | | 36 | | 37 | | 38 | | 39 | | 40 | | 41 | | 42 | | 43 | | 44 | | 45 | | 46 | | 47 | | 48 | | 49 | | 50 | | | | | | | | | |
| ACTION TAKEN | | FUTURE ACTION | | EFFECT ON PLANT | | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | HOURS | | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| X | | 18 | | Z | | 19 | | Z | | 20 | | Z | | 21 | | 22 | | 23 | | 24 | | 25 | | 26 | | 27 | | 28 | | 29 | | 30 | | 31 | | 32 | | 33 | | 34 | | 35 | | 36 | | 37 | | 38 | | 39 | | 40 | | 41 | | 42 | | 43 | | 44 | | 45 | | 46 | | 47 | | 48 | | 49 | | 50 | |

1 0 The cause was the failure of the closure mechanism to fully close the door. Contri-

1 1 buting to this occurrence is the shifting ventilation patterns in the spent fuel pool

1 2 area. Upon discovery, the operator closed the door, removing the unit from the action

1 3 statement. The closure mechanism was adjusted to force the door closed.

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|---|---|---|--------------------|----|------|---------------------|------|----|--------------------|---------------------|------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--|----|------|------|----|
| 1 | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | |
| FACILITY STATUS | | | % POWER | | | OTHER STATUS | | | (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | | | (32) | 80 | |
| 1 | 5 | E | (28) | 0 | 9 | 1 | (29) | NA | (44) | A | (31) | By operator making his rounds | | | | | (46) | 80 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | | | RELEASED OF RELEASE | | | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | | | (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE | | | (36) | 80 | |
| 1 | 6 | Z | (33) | Z | (34) | NA | (44) | NA | (45) | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NUMBER | | | TYPE | | | DESCRIPTION | | | (39) | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (37) | Z | (38) | NA | (44) | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | | | NUMBER | | | DESCRIPTION | | | (41) | | | | | | 80 |
| 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | (40) | NA | (44) | | | | | | | | 80 | | | |
| LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TYPE | | | DESCRIPTION | | | (43) | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| 1 | 9 | Z | (42) | NA | (44) | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | PUBLICITY | | | (45) | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| ISSUED | | | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| 2 | 0 | N | (44) | NA | (45) | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| NRC USE ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <div> <div>80</div> <div>81</div> <div>82</div> <div>83</div> <div>84</div> <div>85</div> <div>86</div> <div>87</div> <div>88</div> <div>89</div> <div>90</div> <div>91</div> <div>92</div> <div>93</div> <div>94</div> <div>95</div> <div>96</div> <div>97</div> <div>98</div> <div>99</div> <div>100</div> </div> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



May 31, 1983

Log No. K83-795
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-29)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-021
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: May 2, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-021 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray /smq

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Tom Peebles
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

JUN 3 1983

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-29

DATE OF EVENT: May 2, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Negative pressure boundary and fire door 406 found open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2532 and Load (Gross MWE) = 831.

Description of Occurrence: On May 2, 1983 at 0830 hours, an operator making his rounds found the Fuel Handling Access Corridor Door 406 ajar. Since this door is both a fire and negative pressure boundary door, the unit entered the action statement of Technical Specifications 3.7.10 and 3.9.12. Technical Specification 3.7.10 requires all fire barriers to be functional at all times. Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires two independent Emergency Ventilation Systems servicing the spent fuel pool area to be operable at all times. With door 406 partially open, the ability of the Emergency Ventilation Systems to maintain the area at a negative pressure of $\geq 1/8$ inch water gauge would have been reduced.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was the failure of the closure mechanism to fully close the door. Contributing to this occurrence is the shifting of ventilation lineups in the spent fuel pool area for periodic testing and maintenance. If the closure is adjusted to allow the door to close under normal conditions, when the ventilation patterns shift, the door slams causing the hardware to become loose. This slamming is also hard on the door itself.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Smoke detector instruments are located on both sides of door 406 and would have provided adequate warning had a fire occurred in the area. In addition, the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.12 was being met during this occurrence since there were no fuel handling operations, nor any crane operations with loads over the storage pool being conducted during this time.

Corrective Action: Upon discovery, the operator closed the door, removing the unit from the action statements. The closure mechanism was adjusted to force the door closed. When the shifting of the ventilation lineups was completed, the closure was readjusted to keep the door from slamming. The closure mechanism on door 406 had previously been replaced with a large style closure mechanism.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-29
PAGE 2

Failure Data: Previous similar occurrences of fire and negative pressure boundary doors being found open due to the failure of the closure mechanism have been reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-81-06 (81-007), NP-33-81-47 (81-042), NP-33-82-041 (82-003), NP-33-83-48 (82-043), and NP-33-83-08 (83-006).

LER #83-021