

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346

UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1

DATE November 9, 1982

COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour

TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000,
Ext. 384

MONTH October, 1982

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	<u>766</u>
2	<u>765</u>
3	<u>766</u>
4	<u>765</u>
5	<u>766</u>
6	<u>765</u>
7	<u>763</u>
8	<u>757</u>
9	<u>751</u>
10	<u>752</u>
11	<u>751</u>
12	<u>760</u>
13	<u>765</u>
14	<u>763</u>
15	<u>763</u>
16	<u>745</u>

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
17	<u>765</u>
18	<u>765</u>
19	<u>765</u>
20	<u>765</u>
21	<u>765</u>
22	<u>764</u>
23	<u>766</u>
24	<u>762</u>
25	<u>764</u>
26	<u>763</u>
27	<u>763</u>
28	<u>17</u>
29	<u>148</u>
30	<u>779</u>
31	<u>804</u>

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
 DATE November 9, 1982
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 TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000,
Ext. 384

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: October, 1982
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874

Notes

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): _____
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: _____

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	<u>745</u>	<u>7,296</u>	<u>37,297</u>
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	<u>722</u>	<u>3,207.9</u>	<u>19,437.9</u>
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>3,357.7</u>
14. Hours Generator On-Line	<u>712.3</u>	<u>3,078.9</u>	<u>18,329.1</u>
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	<u>0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1,732.5</u>
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>1,671,849</u>	<u>6,435,474</u>	<u>41,556,999</u>
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>567,832</u>	<u>2,141,917</u>	<u>13,824,168</u>
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>535,615</u>	<u>2,000,975</u>	<u>12,898,260</u>
19. Unit Service Factor	<u>95.6</u>	<u>42.2</u>	<u>49.1</u>
20. Unit Availability Factor	<u>95.6</u>	<u>42.2</u>	<u>53.8</u>
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	<u>82.3</u>	<u>31.4</u>	<u>39.6</u>
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	<u>79.4</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>38.2</u>
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	<u>4.39</u>	<u>1.05</u>	<u>21.8</u>
24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):			

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: _____
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

INITIAL CRITICALITY
 INITIAL ELECTRICITY
 COMMERCIAL OPERATION

Forecast

Achieved

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH October, 1982DOCKET NO. 50-346UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1DATE November 9, 1982COMPLETED BY Bilal SarsourTELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 384

No.	Date	Type ¹	Duration (Hours)	Reason ²	Method of Shutting Down Reactor ³	Licensee Event Report #	System Code ⁴	Component Code ⁵	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
7	82 10 28	F	32.7	H	3	NA	NA	NA	The reactor tripped by the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) during the performance of PT 5193.01 Main Turbine Steam Valves Test. (See Operational Summary for further details.)

¹
F: Forced
S: Scheduled

²
Reason:
A Equipment Failure (Explain)
B Maintenance or Test
C Refueling
D Regulatory Restriction
E Operator Training & License Examination
F Administrative
G Operational Error (Explain)
H Other (Explain)

³
Method:
1 Manual
2 Manual Scram.
3 Automatic Scram.
4 Continuation from Previous Month
5 Load Reduction
9 Other (Explain)

⁴
Exhibit G - Instructions
for Preparation of Data
Entry Sheets for Licensee
Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-
0161)

⁵
Exhibit I - Same Source

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
October, 1982

10/1 - 10/8

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 86% with the generator gross load at approximately 810 ± 10 MWe. (The station was limited to a power level of 86% because of an inoperable main safety valve. At 0030 hours on October 8, 1982, power was reduced to approximately 80% for turbine valve testing.

10/9 - 10/28

Reactor power was slowly increased and attained 85% on October 16, 1982. Later on October 16, 1982, reactor power was reduced to approximately 83% to perform ST 5013.04, "Control Rod Drive Exercise". Reactor power was also reduced to approximately 80% on October 16, 1982 for turbine valve testing. After the completion of turbine valve testing, reactor power was increased steadily to approximately 85%. The reactor power was maintained at this level until 0150 hours on October 28, 1982 when the reactor tripped during the performance of PT 5193.01, "Main Turbine Steam Valves Test", when a momentary low hydraulic pressure was sensed at the turbine stop valves and the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) automatically tripped the reactor.

10/28 - 10/31

The reactor was critical at 2327 hours on October 28, 1982.

The turbine was synchronized on line at 1033 hours on October 29, 1982.

Reactor power was slowly increased and attained 90% full power on October 30, 1982. Reactor power was maintained at this level for the rest of the month.

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: October, 1982

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: September 3, 1983
3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: October 29, 1983
4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general, will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?
Expect the reload report to require standard reload fuel design Technical Specification (3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems and 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits)
5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information. July, 1983
6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.
None identified to date
7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.
(a) 177 (b) 92 - Spent Fuel Assemblies
8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.
Present 735 Increase size by 0 (zero)
9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.
Date 1992 - assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO. 79-139

SYSTEM: Main Steam

COMPONENT: SP-17A1, SP-17A2, SP-17A8, SP-17A9, SP-17B1, SP-17B2, SP-17B8, and SP-17B9

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-139 encompassed the relocation of 1050 psig safety valves SP-17A1, SP-17A2, SP-17B1 and SP-17B2 in positions which were at the time held by 1100 psig safety valves SP-17A8, SP-17A9, SP-17B8 and SP-17B9, respectively. The 1100 psig safety valves were then relocated to the former position of the 1050 psig safety valves.

REASON FOR CHANGE: FCR 79-139 was implemented to improve the reliability of the 1050 psig safety valves. The station has had difficulty in maintaining these valves within the 1% design setpoint tolerance. See Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-51.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The requested relocation of the four code safety valves on each of the main steam headers caused no adverse effect to the relieving capacity of the valves or of the entire header. No change was made to the setpoints of the valves. Implementation was completed on September 24, 1982. No unreviewed safety question exists.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 80-244

SYSTEM: Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HV&AC)

COMPONENT: HV5301A, HV5301B, HV5301E, HV5361A, HV5362A, HV5362B, HV5311A, HV5311B, HV5311E

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-244 provided for the addition of solenoid valves to the instrument air lines in the Control Room normal ventilation system. These valves were added to the instrument air lines in order to allow for a faster bleed-off time which in turn shortens the response time of the isolation dampers.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Response times for the Control Room ventilation system isolation valves was not within time limits as required by Technical Specifications. See Licensee Event Report NP-33-80-96 for further details.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-244 was completed by an installation similar to that of the existing system which includes Class 1E electrical equipment and seismic Class 1 qualification. The testing accomplished under FCR 80-244 has demonstrated that the response time required for these valves will be met. This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO. 81-138

SYSTEM: Decay Heat

COMPONENT: DH-13A, DH-13B, DH-14A, and DH-14B

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR) 81-138 was implemented in order to revise Note 3 on Drawing 7749-E52B Sheet 25A to read:

FOR DETAILS OF CONTROL SW "CS" SEE DWG E-30B SH. 7
FIG. 7A FOR HIS DH13A AND HIS DH13B AND FIG. 7B FOR
HIS DH14A AND HIS DH14B.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Original Drawing 7749-E52B was incorrect under Revision 5 in such that it referenced "CS" (control switch) for only two valves. The aforesaid revision referenced all four valves with the "CS" notation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change authorized by FCR 81-138 was completed April 7, 1982 and did not create any new adverse environments. No unreviewed safety question was involved.