

0	1	T	N	S	N	P	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	37	CAT		56

CON'T

01 2 8
REPORT SOURCE L 60 61 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 68 7 69 0 5 1 8 8 3 74 8 75 0 5 3 1 8 3 80 9
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Units 1 and 2 were in mode 1 at 100% and 98% Rx power respectively. Start bus

0 3 1B was declared inoperable causing entry into action statement 'a' of 3.8.1.1 for

0 4 both units. While further determining the extent of failure, the diesel generator,

0 5 were not proven operable within one hour as required by the technical specifications.

0 6 There was no effect upon the public health and safety. Previous occurrences -

0 7 none.

[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Start bus 1B failed due to a phase-to-phase fault. The probable cause of failure

1 1 was a breakdown of the insulation on the Westinghouse Model EN-265 bus. The failed

1 2 bus was replaced and the bus returned to service. A permanent solution and

1 3 installation time table is being developed.

1 4 5 8 9
FACILITY STATUS (E) (28) % POWER (1 0 0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY (A) (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 10 Z 34

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (39)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(17)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

8	9	11	12	13	80
PERSONNEL INJURIES					
NUMBER		DESCRIPTION (41)			

8	0	0	0	(40)	NA
9	11	12			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)					
TYPE DESCRIPTION					

QTY		DESCRIPTION		
19	Z	(42)	NA	
8	9	10		
PURITY				80

ISSUED DESCRIPTION
2 0 N 44 NA
PDR ADDCK 05000327
PDR

NRC USE ONLY

Name of Preparer: W. C. Ludwig /M. R. Harding

Phone: (615) 870-6422

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 31, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT SQRO-50-327/83067

The enclosed report provides details concerning the inoperability of start
bus 1B (loss of one source of offsite power). This report is submitted in
accordance with Sequoyah unit 1 Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.b.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Sequoyah

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/83067

Technical Specification Involved: 3.8.1.1

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.b

Date of Occurrence: 05/18/83

Time of Occurrence: 1007 CDT

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

Start bus 1B failed due to a phase-to-phase fault. With start bus 1B inoperable, entry into action statement 'a' of LCO 3.8.1.1 was required. While determining the extent of the failure, the diesel generators were not proven operable within the allotted one hour time limit as described in the technical specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Units 1 and 2 were in mode 1 and at 100% and 98% Rx power.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Start bus 1B was declared inoperable due to a fault between phase B and phase C, and then to ground. The probable cause of the failure was the degradation of the bus sleeve insulation.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Two bus sections on 1B start bus, one on C phase and the other on B phase, failed in the area of a bottom support block. It appeared that C phase and B phase went phase-to-phase and then to ground. This failure can probably be attributed to the degradation of the Noryl Draft Tubing (bus sleeve) on the Westinghouse Model EN-265 bus due to moisture exposure. Further investigation revealed several more degraded areas in the bus sleeves at the support blocks.

From the time that start bus 1B tripped, the investigation to (1) determine the relay actions, (2) physically examine the damage, (3) verify if the bus could be reenergized by another source, and (4) technical specification interpretation complicated by recent modifications that split the start busses prevented a timely start of the diesel generators.

Corrective Action:

All bus sections in the failed areas were replaced and the supports relocated. Where the insulation (bus sleeves) had broken down, it was temporarily repaired using Scotch 130C and 35 tape. Upon completion of the repair, the bus was meggered and hi-potted. The bus duct was reassembled with some new gaskets on the covers. RTV was used to seal the cover bolts and any areas where water might enter. Also, additional filter-drains were installed at low areas in the bus duct to prevent any water accumulation. At present, a final solution is being investigated and will be tentatively scheduled during the next unit 1 refueling outage. The bus was returned to service within the 72-hour time limit.

Upon determining that the start bus 1B was inoperable, placing unit 1 in the action statement, surveillance instruction (SI) 7.1 was run to determine operability of the diesel generators. The SI was successfully completed by 1128 CDT. This is one hour and twenty one minutes instead of the one hour and fifteen minutes as previously reported. Upon further investigation, it was decided to place unit 2 in the same action statement. In the future, it will be impressed upon Operations personnel the importance of determining diesel generator operability.

Failure Data:

None.