

3150-0011

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 27, 1983

USNRC REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
83 MAY 31 AM 10:21

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - DOCKET
NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-296/83028

The enclosed report provides details concerning the failure of a relay coil
which prevented an isolation valve from closing as designed. This report
is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 3 Technical Specification
6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 83028 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.D.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 5/29/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in a refueling outage; unit 2 was operating normally at 100-percent power; unit 3 was operating normally at 100-percent power. Unit 3 was the only unit affected by this event. On April 29, 1983, while investigating a "Fuse Blown" annunciation, it was found that the normally energized coil for relay 16A-K79 had failed. The relay coil, GE model No. 366A772G9, had overheated and melted the coil spool material, thus sticking the armature in the energized position. The armature being stuck in the energized position prevented Flow Control Valve (FCV), FCV-43-13, Recirculation Sample Line Isolation Valve, from closing upon relay failure as designed. FCV-43-13 was declared inoperable (Technical Specification 3.7.D.2). Redundant isolation valve FCV-43-14 was closed. Relay 16A-K79, GE model No. 12HFA51A49H, was replaced. Surveillance Instruction 4.7.D.1.a-1 was performed and the valve returned to service. The valve was inoperable for 5.75 hours. There was no effect upon the public health and safety. Redundant valve FCV-43-14 was placed in the mode corresponding to an isolated condition as specified in Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. Approximately 3000 HFA relays are installed at Browns Ferry. Since January, 1981 the failure rate for HFA relays is approximately 0.27 percent per year. Therefore this event is considered a random failure and no recurrence control is required.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/8212

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP