LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: V A S P S 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT: (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 4 3 0 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 5 2 7 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, PT-27 revealed that amp readings for heat tracing

0 3 Panel 8, circuits 5A and 22A were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the

0 4 PT. This event is contrary to T.S.3.3.A.4 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

0 5 The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, therefore, the health and safety

0 6 of the public were not affected.

0 7

0 8

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: S H (11) | CAUSE CODE: (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: (13) | COMPONENT CODE: H E A T E R (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 2 2 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: C (18) | FUTURE ACTION: F (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: L (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: T 1 8 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat. The defective heat tracing was

1 1 replaced and tested. A design change has been prepared to change the manner by

1 2 which these borated lines are heat traced. Installation of this design change has

1 3 commenced.

1 4

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Periodic Test

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: N/A

PUBLICITY

2 0 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER: J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 83-022/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 04-30-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. Description of the Event

With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, PT-27 revealed that the amp readings for heat tracing Panels 8, circuits 5A and 22A (Recirculation to the BIT and filter outlet to blender respectively) were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.A.4 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The heat tracing circuits are intended to maintain a fluid temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuits were operable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The defective heat tracing tape was replaced and tested within the time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No additional actions were deemed necessary.

7. Generic Implications

A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the heat tracing system and a Design Change has been prepared as a result of the Task Force study. The design change has been completed on Unit 1 CVCS. Unit 2 CVCS will be completed during the forthcoming refueling outage.