

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)01 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CONT

01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During a routine review of SI 4.7.B-4, SBGTS HEPA test, it was discovered that

03 | the downstream HEPA filters in SBGTS trains B & C had exceeded the 18-month test

04 | frequency specified in TS 4.7.B.2.a. SBGTS is common to units 1, 2, and 3.

05 | There was no effect on the health and safety of the public in that there was no

06 | challenge to these filters during the period of concern. Also, the upstream

07 | filter on trains B & C and all filters on train A were tested successfully

08 | within the required frequency.

09 | S | C | 11 | A | 12 | B | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16 |

17 | LER NO. | 8 | 3 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100

10 | H | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | L | 25 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Personnel error caused the surveillance to be recorded complete when only

11 | upstream HEPA in trains B & C were DOP tested. Downstream filters on trains B &

12 | C were immediately tested. Scheduling personnel will reschedule SI 4.7.B-4 as

13 | appropriate per data sheet. Maintenance SI's will not be credited to scheduled

14 | SI requirements unless cognizant engineer specifies that such credit is valid.

15 | H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | 31 | Review of Surveillance Instruction | 32 |

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36 |

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39 |

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41 |

19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43 |

20 | 44 | NA | 45 |

NAME OF PREPARER J. O. Ely

PHONE 205/729-0834

8306070241 830527
PDR ADOCK 05000259
S PDR

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 83022 Technical Specification Involved 4.7.B.2.a

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3) * Date Due NRC 5/29/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in refuel outage, unit 2 was at steady state at 99-percent power and unit 3 was at steady state at 99-percent power. While pursuing a routine question about the most recent performance of SI 4.7.B-4, Standby Gas Treatment High Efficiency Particulate Activity Test, it was discovered that the downstream high efficiency particulate activity (HEPA) filters in standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) trains "B" and "C" had not been DOP tested during the previous 18-months as required by Technical Specification 4.7.B.2.a. The upstream filters on SBGTS trains "B" and "C", and all filters on train "A", had been DOP tested within the required frequency. There was no effect on public health and safety. No significant occurrence resulted from this event. SI 4.7.B-4 was successfully performed on the downstream HEPA's immediately after discovery of the event. No other compensatory measures were necessary.

Personnel error caused this event. The surveillance instruction was performed on the upstream HEPA's of SBGTS trains "B" and "C" following their replacement on April 29-30, 1982, respectively. Scheduling personnel reviewed the data cover sheet and assumed that all HEPA filters in these trains had been DOP tested, and rescheduled the surveillance instruction for all HEPA's 18-months from that date.

Scheduling personnel have been instructed to not give credit to scheduled SI requirements for maintenance SI's unless the cognizant engineer specifies that such credit is valid. Additionally, the test personnel involved have been instructed to provide additional information on data cover sheets to preclude such events in the future. It should be noted that this error is considered to be a legitimate error that resulted from personnel trying to take advantage of an unscheduled test to minimize unnecessary testing and operational requirements. The error should not be interpreted as inattention to details or lack of effort in any way.

* Previous Similar Events:

LER BFRO-50-259/8009

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 27, 1983

83 MAY 31 11:21
USNRC REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83022

The enclosed report provides details concerning failure to test standby gas
treatment system, trains "B" and "C" high-efficiency particulate activity
(HEPA) filters within 18 months as required by Technical Specification
4.7.B.2.a. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1
Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry