

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'TEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE								
0	9	I	A	E		I	N	S	T	R	U	S		Z	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.					
17		8	3		0	2	3	/	0	3		0			
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33			
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
E	X	Z	Z		0	0	0	0	Y	N	T	S	3	8	2
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

FACILITY
STATUS

ACTIVITY	CONTENT
RELEASED	OF RELEASE

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

PERSONNEL INJURIES

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (42)

PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NAME OF PREPARER G. T. Chambers

PHONE: (205) 729-0841

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 27, 1983

83 JUN 3 P10:53

USNRC REGION I
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET
NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-260/83023

The enclosed report provides details concerning the setpoint drift of a
drywell pressure switch. This report is submitted in accordance with
Browns Ferry unit 2 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(1).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. J. Green
H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-260 / 83023 Technical Specification Involved 3.1.A

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(1) * Date Due NRC 06/02/83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was in a refueling outage. Units 2 and 3 were operating at 99.6-percent power. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.1.A-6 (Reactor Protection System High Drywell Pressure), pressure switch 2-PS-64-56A was found to operate at 2.55 psig. Technical Specification 3.1.A requires a trip setting of 2.5 psig. Above this trip setting 2-PS-64-56A initiates a Drywell High Pressure Half Scram. The switch was recalibrated, functionally tested (SI 4.1.A-6) and returned to service. There was no danger to the public health or safety because redundant switches were available and operable. See the attached action plan category 3 for corrective action.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/82002, 81048,
260/77014, 78023, 79019, 81053
296/77006, 82012, 82013, 82039, 83012

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

ACTION PLAN
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS
PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.