



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Ken Powers  
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

July 27, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES  
DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TSs) 3.3.3.8, 3.7.11.2, AND  
3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-07

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the fire detection instruments in Fire Zone 116 for the auxiliary building cask loading area being inoperable for a period of time greater than the allowable TS timeframe. Also provided in this special report are details concerning the removal of the biological shield blocks and opening of the Unit 2 equipment hatch. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statements 3.3.3.8.(b), 3.7.11.2(a), and 3.7.12(a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

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## ENCLOSURE

### SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-07

#### I. FIRE DETECTORS IN CASK LOADING AREA IN AUXILIARY BUILDING

##### Description of Condition

On June 21, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 84 percent power beginning coast-down to a refueling outage, the ionization fire detection instrumentation in the auxiliary building cask loading area (Fire Zone 116) was declared inoperable, and limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 was entered. LCO 3.7.11.2 was also entered because the automatic actuation ability of the sprinkler system in this area was disabled, i.e., fire detectors declared inoperable.

##### Cause of Condition

The fire detectors in the auxiliary building cask loading area were disabled to prevent the exhaust of diesel trucks from initiating invalid fire alarm signals. This area is used to unload fuel casks and equipment needed to support the Unit 2 refueling outage. The fire detectors will be disabled for the duration of the Unit 2 refueling outage and will exceed the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe as specified in LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b).

##### Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (a) and LCO 3.7.11.2 Action Statement (a), an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the auxiliary building cask loading area. The patrol will be maintained until the outage activities in the area are completed, the detectors are returned to operable status, and LCOs 3.3.3.8 and 3.7.11.2 have been exited.

#### II. REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 2 BIOLOGICAL SHIELD BLOCKS

##### Description of Condition

On July 5, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 3 entering a refueling outage, the biological shield blocks were removed and the Unit 2 equipment hatch was opened. The hatch will be open for the duration of the refueling outage and in excess of the 7-day TS allowable timeframe. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The shield blocks were removed to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel into Unit 2 containment. The shield blocks will remain open for the duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the hatch were verified operable; a roving fire patrol was immediately established and will be maintained until the hatch is closed and the blocks are reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier before entering Mode 4.