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P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

March 18, 1983

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Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket No. 50-416/417
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-83/02, Interim Report,
Liberty Control Telephone
Relays
AECM-83/0196

On February 17, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns Liberty Control Telephone Relays.

MP&L has evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is not reportable for Unit 1. This deficiency was reported to your office, for Unit 2, as being potentially reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). The investigation, for Unit 2, is continuing.

Attached is our Interim Report. MP&L expects to submit a Final Report by April 18, 1983.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
For Vice President

ACP:dr
ATTACHMENT
cc: See page 2

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cc: Mr. J. B. Richard
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

INTERIM REPORT FOR PRD-83/02

I. Description of the Deficiency

On May 5, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company received GE Service Advice (SA) 721-PSM-167.1 concerning a possible defect with Liberty Control Company telephone relays that are used in General Electric Protective Relays. The Service Advice states that the defect involves a contact button separated from the contact arm of the relay on relays manufactured between July 1980 and February 1982.

This deficiency is not applicable to the NSSS scope of supply for either Unit 1 of Unit 2 in that none of the relays which GE supplied to Grand Gulf had any problems as described in the Service Advice letter.

This deficiency is not applicable to the Bechtel scope of supply for Unit 1 in that a field inspection, by MP&L Plant Staff, revealed no relays which fell within the specified time frame of the Service Advice. Therefore, the determination has been made that this deficiency is not reportable, for Unit 1, under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21.

For the Unit 2 Bechtel scope of supply, an investigation/inspection was performed to determine if any of the relays, noted by the Service Advice, were used in safety-related equipment. Seven (7) relays were identified in safety-related applications. They are:

(1) 25BA3 - Device 27/62 - Relay Type 12SAM11A22A
(2) 25BA6 - Device 27/B - Relay Type 12NGV12B15A
(3) 2H22 - P113 - Device 151GD - Relay Type 12SFC151A1A
(4) 2H22 - P113 - Device 127DA - Relay Type 12NGV13B21A
(5) 2H22 - P115 - Device 159 - Relay Type 12NGV23A2A
(6) 2H22 - P115 - Device 151GD - Relay Type 12SFC151A1A
(7) 21DA - Device 27B - Relay Type 12NGV18A2A

Our Architect/Engineer responded to each of the above relays with the following rationale.

For relays (1) and (2):

Relay 27/62 for bus 25BA3 has a Normally Open (N/O) contact which accuates auxiliary relay 27X during load center bus 25BA3 undervoltage. Relay 27X is used to trip bus loads during bus 25BA3 undervoltage. Therefore, failure of relay 27/62 will affect only load center 25BA3 of Division I power. Division II power is unaffected.

Since the design function of this relay is to trip on bus undervoltage, which would have to occur to initiate a challenge to the relay, the bus loads would not be available in any case.

For relays (3) and (6):

Relay 151GD is used as a diesel generator ground fault detection relay. Designed operation of this relay, even during LOCA, is to trip the generator. Irrespective of the operation of the 151GD relay the diesel generator would be considered to be unavailable due to the ground fault condition. A relay failure would affect only one power division and would not decrease the designed availability of the diesel generator.

For relay (4):

This relay is installed but not used.

For relay (5):

This overvoltage relay only provides an alarm of an overvoltage condition at the diesel generator and does not have any control function.

And for relay (7):

The relay provides only an alarm of the undervoltage condition of 125V DC bus 21DA and has no control function.

According to our Architect/Engineer, there would be no impact on plant safety. However, MP&L Project Engineering is continuing to investigate this deficiency to determine reportability under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

Investigations are continuing to determine if this deficiency is reportable for Unit 2. Our Constructor has determined that the corrective action will be to replace the nonconforming relays.

III. Status of Proposed Resolution

Our Constructor will have all corrective actions completed by October 15, 1983.

IV. Reason Why a Final Report Will Be Delayed

A Final Report will be delayed until MP&L Project Engineering has determined whether or not the rationale supplied by our Architect/Engineer substantiates that there would be no impact on plant safety.

V. Date When a Final Report Will Be Submitted

MP&L expects to submit a Final Report concerning this matter by April 18, 1983.

bcc: Mr. R. T. Lally
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