

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

REPORT
SOURCE

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0	8
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SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

R	B	(11)	E	(12)	E	(13)	I	N	S	T	R	U	(14)	S	(15)	Z	(16)
9	10		11		12		13					18	19		20		

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.	
17		8	2		0	2	9		T		0
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	
X	18	X	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	22
NPRO-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER							
N	24	A	25	M	0	4	0				
42		43		44		45		46		47	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Cause of the magnetrol failure (model 402) is not known. Visual inspection, with the
1 1 cover removed, revealed no abnormalities and during subsequent testing the symptoms
1 2 would not repeat. Dresden On-site Review (82-18) was performed, and magnetrol switches
1 3 will be tested weekly for the next month to verify operability. The vendor will review
this incident.

FACILITY STATUS				% POWER				OTHER STATUS (30)				METHOD OF DISCOVERY				DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)			
1	5	E	(28)	0	9	9	(29)	N/A				B	(31)	Surveillance Testing					

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
1 6 2 (33) 2 (34) N/A

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	N/A		

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION
NUMBER		
1 3	0 0 0	N/A

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	9	Z	(42) N/A	

4 9 10 80

PUBLICITY

ISSUED N (44) DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0

8208020254 820722

PDR ADOCK 05000249

S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER R. Whalen

PHONE: 815-942-2920, ext. 523

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 82-29/01T-0

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)

DRESDEN UNIT 3

DOCKET # 50-249

At 1715 hours on July 12, 1982, during normal unit operation the Unit 3 scram discharge volume float switches were being functionally tested as is normally done on a quarterly basis. It was found that level switches LS3-302-82C and LS3-302-82D (both Magnetrol Model 402) did not trip although they had been properly loaded by water (T.S. Table 3.1.1). These switches are associated with the east scram discharge volume. No previous failures of this equipment have occurred.

These Magnetrol switches, in conjunction with redundant Barton devices, provide assurance that the scram discharge volume does not become filled to a level that could preclude the necessary influx of water exhausting from the control rod drives during a scram. The 82C and 82D switches failed to open on three consecutive trials although they had been properly loaded. Both switches were then visually checked by removing their covers. No adjustments were made and no defects were noted. The switches were then tested, and found to operate properly. Their covers were then replaced, and they were tested eight times and found to operate properly in all cases. The east scram discharge volume level was continuously monitored by the redundant Barton units which would have provided a full unit scram had the scram discharge volume level risen abnormally. All of the west bank scram discharge volume level switches were found to operate properly.

Further visual inspection on July 13, 1982, has shown that the 82C and 82D switches are mounted in such a way that tight clearances require canting the covers while removing them. The switches have been checked for interior scratches and/or bent linkages that could have occurred while removing or installing the covers. However, this second inspection showed no conclusive evidence of damage. These switches were also functionally tested again at this time with proper operation found in each case.

The internal switch wiring is kept away from the moving parts by means of a guard. For this reason, it is felt that the wiring could not have restricted the internal linkages. The contacts were checked for proper adjustment.

Although the switches have been thoroughly checked and tested, their failure has not been repeatable nor has any damage been found. Proper filling of the test line with water during testing was verified by means of water flowing from the high point vents. The internal switch mechanism moves freely and does not appear to be hanging up on any type of blockage in the instrument volume. The Magnetrol Company has been notified, and a member of their engineering staff is to visit the site for further review of this incident. All of the Magnetrol scram discharge volume level switches will be tested weekly for the following month to verify their proper operation.



Commonwealth Edison

DEVIATION REPORT

DVR NO. 12 - 3 - 82 - 45
STA UNIT YEAR NO.

PART 1 TITLE OF DEVIATION

OCCURRED

7-12-82

1715

DATE

TIME

Scram Discharge Volume Level Switches Failure To Trip

SYSTEM AFFECTED 300
CRD

PLANT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

MODE RUN

PWR(MWT) 2518

LOAD(MWE)

815

TESTING

☒ YES☐ NO

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

While conducting Special Procedure 82-6-61 Rev. 0 (Scram Discharge Volume Scram Surveillance), it was found that level switches number LS3-302-82C and LS3-302-82D did not trip. Visually inspected both switches with their covers off. Switches began to operate. Reinstalled covers and operated eight times successfully.

10 CFR50.72 NRC RED PHONE

☐ YES☒ NO

NOTIFICATION MADE

YES

NO

EQUIPMENT FAILURE

D 21580

☐ YES☒ NO

WORK REQUEST NO.

RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR

D. Reiersen

DATE 7/12/82

PART 2 OPERATING ENGINEER'S COMMENTS

Subsequent to finding that the 82C switch would not operate, an inspection was performed with no problems found. The switch then started to operate, and was successfully tripped eight times. The surveillance then progressed to the 82D switch which displayed the same phenomena. The redundant barton trip units(2) were operable to effect a reactor scram, if the east scram discharge volume would have filled with water to the trip point. The 82C and 82D switches are magnetrol float switches associated with the east scram discharge volume. (over)

☐ EVENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST☐ TECH. SPEC. VIOLATION☐ NON REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE☒ 14 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S.6.6.B.1.a.☐ 30 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S.☐ ANNUAL/SPECL REPORT REQ'D☒ 24-HOUR NRC NOTIFICATION REQ'D

TELEPH Tom Tongue

REGION III

7/13/82 1015

DATE TIME

TELEGM/TELECOPY J. Keppler

REGION III

7/13/82 1033

DATE TIME

☐ CECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE

IF ABOVE NOTIFICATION IS PER 10CFR21

☐ 5-DAY WRITTEN REPORT REQ'D PER 10CFR21

TELEPH D. Galle

CECO CORPORATE OFFICER

7/13/82 0900

DATE TIME

PRELIMINARY REPORT
COMPLETED AND REVIEWED

Michael Wright

7/13/82

OPERATING ENGINEER

INVESTIGATED REPORT & RESOLUTION
ACCEPTED BY STATION REVIEWRESOLUTION APPROVED AND
AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION

86-5176 (FORM 15-22-1) 10-81

STATION SUPERINTENDENT

DATE

Operating Engineer's Comments

The scram discharge volume scram surveillance was successfully completed for the four barton trip switches and the two magnetrol switches on the west scram discharge volume with no abnormalities found.