

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/2/3/8/3/ (8) /0/5/2/0/8/3/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On April 23 and 24, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, an 86 lockout relay wiring /
/0/3/ / omission was detected while testing the 2H bus charging high head safety inject- /
/0/4/ / ion pump breakers. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c. Breaker /
/0/5/ / lock out protection was defeated. The corresponding 2J bus breakers were wired /
/0/6/ / correctly. No 2H bus breaker problems were caused by the omission. The public /
/0/7/ / health and safety were not affected. /
/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/ /S/F/ (11)	/B/ (12)	/C/ (13)	/C/K/T/B/R/K/ (14)	/E/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.

(17) /8/3/ /-/ /0/3/5/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
/F/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /Y/ (24) /A/ (25) /G/0/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / In July 1980, prior to Unit 2 commercial operation, an Engineering Design and Co- /
/1/1/ / ordination Report revised the breaker wiring by adding the wiring that was found /
/1/2/ / to be missing. It appears that the wiring was not installed as required. Re- /
/1/3/ / quired wiring has been installed and the breaker tested. Other charging pump /
/1/4/ / breakers were checked for the same problem. No additional problems were found. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /H/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/B/ (31)	/ Preventive Maint. Testing /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER E. Wayne Harrell

PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-339
Attachment to LER 83-035/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

Description of Event

On April 23 and 24, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, while performing protective relay tests, the lockout relays (86 relays) for charging/high head safety injection pump motor breakers 25H6 and 25H7 failed to lock in after being energized. Investigation revealed that the breaker control switches in the main control room were missing a wire linking the 86 relay lock in contact with the 125 VDC power supply via the control switch contacts. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Normally the 86 lockout relay prevents a breaker from reclosing after an overcurrent trip. The 86 relay remains locked in until the operator places the control switch in either the stop or pull-to-lock position.

The 25H6 breaker is the supply breaker for charging high head safety injection pump "1A" and the 25H7 breaker is the normal breaker (25J7 is the alternate breaker) for charging high head safety injection pump "1C". If either the 25H6 or 25H7 breaker had experienced an overcurrent condition the breakers would have tripped as expected; however, if an auto start signal was present, the breaker would have reclosed on a faulted condition.

Since the charging high head safety injection pump are tested at least once monthly (the operating and standby pump are usually shifted during surveillance testing), an undetected faulted condition could only exist for a short time period. Automatic start signals occur infrequently. The probability of having an automatic start signal simultaneously with a previously undetected motor or breaker fault is small.

No operational or equipment problems were caused by the improperly wired control switch. "2J" bus breakers 25J6, "1B" charging high head safety injection pump breaker, and 25J7, alternate "1C" charging high head safety injection pump breaker, protective relay tests showed the control circuiting for the "2J" bus breakers performed correctly. The public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

A human engineering evaluation for the North Anna Control Room conducted in March 1980 indicated that a method to indicate burnt out indication bulbs was required. At that time Unit 2 had not obtained an

operating license and was in a "Pre-Operational" status. On April 1, 1980 the Architect Engineer, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, began issuing Engineering & Design Coordination Reports (E&DCR's) to install a lamp test system. It appears that wiring changes required by E&DCR P-2723E-2 issued on April 29, 1980 removed the Control Room control switch 86 lockout relay wiring for the 25H6 and 25H7 breakers. E&DCR P-2723U-2 issued on July 17, 1980 revised the control switch wiring by adding the 86 lockout relay wiring omitted by E&DCR P-2723E-2. It appears that the 86 lockout wiring was not installed as required.

Protective relay testing which is scheduled once per refueling was performed on breakers 25J6 and 25J7 in April 1982 during the first Unit 2 refueling outage; however, because operation of the "1B" charging high head safety injection pump, an initial condition required by the protective relay tests for breakers 25H6 and 25H7, was precluded by ongoing "1B" pump mechanical problems, protective relay testing of the 25H6 and 25H7 breakers was deferred until the next outage. During the recent (second) Unit 2 refueling outage protective relay testing of the 25H6 and 25H7 breakers detected the 86 lockout relay wiring problem.

Immediate Corrective Action

On April 27, 1983 an Engineering Work Request (EWR) was issued to install the required main control board switch 86 lockout relay wiring for the 25H6 and 25H7 breakers. Wiring modifications were completed by April 29, 1983. Final testing of the lock out relays was completed on May 12, 1983 prior to changing from mode 5 to Mode 4 operation. Unit 2 2J bus charging high head safety injection pump breaker protective relay testing performed in April 1983 was reviewed to insure a similar problem did not exist on the 2J charging high head safety injection pump breakers. Unit 1 1J and 1H charging high head safety injection pump breaker protective relay testing performed in June and July 1982 was reviewed to insure a similar problem did not exist on Unit 1.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The immediate corrective actions resolved the problem. No further corrective actions are required.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

All Unit 1 and Unit 2 charging high head safety injection protective relay tests were reviewed as described above to insure that similar breaker problems did not recur.

Generic Implications

The reviews described above indicate that this event was isolated.

This event had no generic implications.

Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

P. O. BOX 402

MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

83 MAY 25 11:05

May 20, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. N-83-060
NO/ RCS: nih
Docket No. 50-339
License No. NPF-7

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following License Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit No. 2.

Report No.


Applicable Technical Specifications

LER 83-035/03L-0

T.S. 6.9.1.9.c

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,


E. Wayne Harrell
for Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Document Control Desk (1 copy)
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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