

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	3	6	1	7	0	4	2	6	8	3	8	0	5	1	2	8	3	9
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					68	69	EVENT DATE					74	75	REPORT DATE					80			

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | At approximately 1830 with the Unit in Mode 4 and preparations in progress for Mode 3
0 3 | entry, Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) heat exchanger isolation valves 2HV8150,
0 4 | 2HV8152 and 2HV8153 could not be remotely opened from the Control Room. Since these
0 5 | valves are required to be remotely operated from the Control Room upon initiation of
0 6 | shutdown cooling to avoid personnel radiation exposure from local operation,
0 7 | a Mode 3 restraint was imposed on the Unit. Public health and safety were not
0 8 | affected during this event.

0 9		SYSTEM CODE C F 11		CAUSE CODE B 12		CAUSE SUBCODE C 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P 14				COMP. SUBCODE F 15		VALVE SUBCODE Z 16		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21		
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 8 3		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 8		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		REPORT TYPE L		REVISION NO. 0						
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35		
ACTION TAKEN E 18		FUTURE ACTION X 19		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25		
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47		
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 9 26																

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The inability of the valves to remotely open was attributed to incorrect open

1 1 sequence torque and limit switch settings. The incorrect settings caused the motor

1 2 on the valves to stop before the valves had come off their seats. The limit

1 3 and open sequence torque switch settings were adjusted and the valves successfully

1 4 stroke tested from the Control Room on April 26, 1983. (See attachment.)

FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (B) (29) % POWER (0) (0) (0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) NA
 ACTIVITY CONTENT (1) 6 (Z) (33) (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (B) (31) Testing DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
 RELEASED OF RELEASE LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	40 NA

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

PUBLICATION		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION		NRC USE ONLY											
2	0	N	44	NA													
7	8	9	10														

NRC USE ONLY

714/492-7700

H. B. RAY

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

SCE

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

May 12, 1983

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
14-day Follow-up Report
Licensee Event Report No. 83-038
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Reference: Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to J. B. Martin (NRC),
dated April 27, 1983

The referenced letter provided you with confirmation of our prompt notification pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12.i of Appendix A, Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License NPF-10 for San Onofre Unit 2 involving Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) heat exchanger isolation valves.

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12.i, this submittal provides the required 14-day follow-up report and a copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) 83-038 to address this event.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,



IE 22
83-217

cc: A.E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
R.J. Pate (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-038
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 2, DOCKET NO. 50-361

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE
ACTION

Based on this occurrence and prior problems, these valves will be included in a current Task Force investigation addressing problems associated with limit and position switches including procedures associated with their maintenance and operation. A certification program for personnel working on such limit and position switches has also been established. Additionally, as described in LER 82-170 (Docket 50-361), the SDCS valves will be replaced during the first refueling outage.

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