

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

USNRC REGION I
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

January 21, 1982 JAN 26 P12: 57

BLRD-50-438/82-05
BLRD-50-439/82-05

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - SEISMIC SUPPORT LUGS ON 2-INCH
OR LESS STAINLESS STEEL PIPE - BLRD-50-438/82-05, 50-439/82-05 - FIRST
INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. V. Crlenjak on December 24, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR 1690. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our
next report by March 24, 1982.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch
with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills
L. M. Mills, Manager

Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SEISMIC SUPPORT LUGS ON 2-INCH OR LESS STAINLESS STEEL PIPE
BLRD-50-438/82-05, BLRD-50-439/82-05
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Because of the relatively large amount of weld required for lug attachment, it is suspected that stainless steel pipe (2-inch diameter and less) in the areas where lugs are attached may not meet ASME Code parts NB-NC-ND4200 ovality tolerances and may exhibit burn-thru or oxidation.

Interim Progress

TVA is investigating this matter to determine the likelihood of the suspected conditions and to determine if these conditions are attributable to improper workmanship, procedures, or design.

More information will be forwarded to you in our next report.