DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

May 13, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e. please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 414/83-08.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

RWO/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

Palmetto Alliance
2135½ Devine Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29205

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. Robert Guild
Attorney-at-Law
P. O. Box 12097
Charleston, South Carolina 29412

DUKE POWER COMPANY
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY

REPORT NUMBER: SD 414/83-08

REPORT DATE: May 13, 1983

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY: A tack weld was found on the shaft/rotor assembly of a motor used on a limitorque operator, which was installed on a Class 1 Kerotest valve. The deficiency was identified on February 2, 1983.

INITIAL REPORT: Initial report was made to Greg Nejfelt, Region II NRC, on April 15, 1983 by Messrs. J. K. Berry, H. E. Edwards and C. A. Bell, of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, NC 28242.

COMPONENT AND SUPPLIER: Reliance motor, S/N 716251-PB. The motor was mounted on a model SMB-000 limitorque operator, S/N 244815 and installed on a Kerotest item 9J-510 valve.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The deficiency was found during inspection of the valve/operator per Construction procedure CP-168. During this inspection, a tack weld was found where the shaft connects to the rotor in the motor of the limitorque operator. A feeler gauge indicated a space of 0.005" between the shaft and rotor. The standard assembly procedure for a Reliance shaft/rotor assembly is a press fit of these parts. The tack weld of the shaft to the rotor is a departure from standard Reliance assembly procedures and violates the operator qualification by type test.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS: The valve application is active Class 1E. Although no failure has occurred, the unqualified construction of the shaft/rotor provides inadequate assurance that the motor and actuator will perform its safety related function.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The affected motor has been sent back to the manufacturer (Reliance) for evaluation. Since a tack weld is not in accordance with standard assembly procedures, the shaft/rotor assembly will be repaired, or replaced and the motor returned to Duke. Reliance's evaluation is expected by June 3, 1983. A final report will be submitted at that time.