

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
8 9 LICENSE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 27 CAT 520 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 1 2 2 8 2 8 0 2 1 9 8 2 9  
8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 58 59 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit operating at 100% power, a loss of boric acid flow to the blender  
0 3 was observed while trying to blend to the VCT. This event occurred twice on  
0 4 January 22nd, 1982, and again on January 25th, 1982. This is contrary to T.S.3.2.C.4  
0 5 and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Since during accident conditions, the  
0 6 BAST is isolated with boric acid being supplied by the RWST, the health and safety of  
0 7 the public were not affected.

0 8 \_\_\_\_\_ 80

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
S H 11 X 12 Z 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 Z 15 Z 16  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
8 2 0 0 3 0 3 L 6  
21 22 23 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32  
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
X 18 Z 19 Z 20 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 7 9 9 9 26  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47  
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation has determined this event to have been caused by inadequate insulation  
1 1 on FT-1113 and the adjacent piping. The blockages were removed or freed and  
1 2 additional insulation has been added to prevent recurrence. Appropriate personnel  
1 3 will be informed of the need for insulation and the care of insulation on boric  
1 4 acid piping systems.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A A 31 Operational Event.  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80  
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 60

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
0 0 0 40 N/A  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)  
Z 42 N/A  
7 8 9 10 80

8203080464 820219  
PDR ADDOCK 05000280  
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

N/A

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1  
DOCKET NO: 50-280  
REPORT NO: 82-003/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 01-22-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: FLOW TRANSMITTER 1113 PLUGGED

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With Unit 1 operating at 100% power, a loss of boric acid flow to the blender was observed while trying to blend to the VCT. This event occurred twice on January 22nd, 1982, and again on January 25th, 1982. This loss of a flow path from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) to the charging pumps is contrary to T.S.3.2.C.4 and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

Rapid response to the flow blockage limited the loss of flow to a period of 3 hours and 12 minutes, 30 minutes, and 3 minutes respectively. Since during accident conditions, the BAST is isolated with Boric Acid being supplied from the RWST, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

This event has been determined to have been caused by the lack of adequate insulation on FT-1113 and the adjacent piping. This inadequate insulation nullified the effect of heat tracing in the area by allowing the rapid dissipation of heat. This loss of heat allowed the growth of boric acid crystals producing a slush which served to block flow at the inlet of FT-1113.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate corrective action consisted of freeing or removing the boric acid plug and verifying boric acid flow to the blender.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Additional insulation has been added to reduce heat losses to ambient.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The need for insulation and the care of insulation will be emphasized to personnel that work on or around boric acid systems.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

A sufficient amount of insulation and heat tracing are essential on boric acid lines that are allowed to become stagnant even for a short period of time.