

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 V A S P S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CONT

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 1 2 0 8 2 8 0 2 1 9 8 2 9  
7 8 DOCKET NUMBER 58 59 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit at 100%, both containment vacuum pumps were declared inoperable when  
0 3 they failed to develop flow. Inoperability of both pumps is contrary to  
0 4 T.S.3.15.B and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). At no time did the containment  
0 5 exceed the limits allowed by the operating envelope governed by containment  
0 6 temperature, containment pressure and service water temperature as set forth in  
0 7 T.S.3.8. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  
S A 11 E 12 B 13 P U M P X X 14 H 15 Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 21 22  
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRO-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
D 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 L 25 G 0 4 6 26  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Water accumulation in the common discharge piping of the two containment vacuum pumps  
1 1 prevented flow. The corrective action was to drain the piping and return vacuum  
1 2 pump 1-CV-P-1A to service.

1 3

1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A A 31 Operator Observation1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
0 0 0 40 N/A1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 43  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
Z 42 N/A8203080462 820219  
PDR ADOCK 05000280  
PDR

S 7 8 9 10 N/A 58 59 80

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson

NRC USE ONLY  
DATE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1  
DOCKET NO: 50-280  
REPORT NO: 82-002/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 01-20-82

TITLE OF EVENT: 1-CV-P-1A and 1B INOPERABLE

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 01-20-82, with the unit at 100% power, both containment vacuum pumps, 1CV-P-1A and 1B, were noted to be developing zero flow. Both pumps were declared inoperable.

Inoperability of both mechanical containment vacuum pumps is contrary to Technical Specification 3.15.B and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OCCURRENCE:

At no time during this event did the containment exceed the limits of the operating envelope set forth in Technical Specification 3.8. These limits are governed by containment pressure, containment temperature and service water temperature. Because the containment air pressure remained sub-atmospheric and one containment vacuum pump was returned to service within the time allowed by Technical Specification 3.0.1, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The event was caused by water accumulation in the containment vacuum system piping. The water accumulated in the drain pot of the common discharge line of the vacuum pumps and thereby prevented flow. Moisture from the containment atmosphere condenses in the system piping due to the cool ambient temperature of the auxiliary building. Unusually high humidity due to a steam generator blowdown line leak near the suction for 1-CV-P-1B is believed to have been a major contributor to the event.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to drain the water from the discharge line drain pot of the pumps. Vacuum pump, 1-CV-P-1A, was then returned to service as it had remained mechanically operable.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Vacuum pump 1-CV-P-1B was replaced. The replacement pump was a shop spare.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The source of steam near the inlet to the containment vacuum system has been repaired during the current maintenance outage. This should aid in preventing the accumulation of significant amounts of water in the containment vacuum system.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.