

CONTROL BLOCK: 

--	--	--	--	--	--

 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
P A B V S 1										0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0										4 1 1 1 4										5																																																	
L I C E N S E E C O D E										L I C E N S E N U M B E R										L I C E N S E T Y P E										C A T 5 8																																																	
R E P O R T S O U R C E										D O C K E T N U M B E R										E V E N T D A T E										R E P O R T D A T E																																																	
E V E N T D E S C R I P T I O N A N D P R O B A B L E C O N S E Q U E N C E S																																																																															
On 1/27/82 at 1415 hours the backup RHR pump, [RH-P-1A], became unavail-																																																																															
able when its normal AC power source was lost due to a fault in a section																																																																															
of 4KV bus cable. The faulted area was between the 1C Unit Station Ser-																																																																															
vice Transformer secondary and the 1A bus supply breaker. The No. 1 Emer-																																																																															
gency Diesel Generator was also inoperable at this time for modifications.																																																																															
Public health and safety was not jeopardized since the running pump,																																																																															
[RH-P-1B], remained in service for core decay heat removal.																																																																															
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> SYSTEM CODE E B 11 </div> <div> CAUSE CODE E 12 </div> <div> CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 </div> <div> COMPONENT CODE E L E C T R O N 14 </div> <div> COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 </div> <div> VALVE SUBCODE Z 16 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> LER RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 17 </div> <div> EVENT YEAR 8 2 18 </div> <div> SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 4 19 </div> <div> OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 20 </div> <div> REPORT TYPE L 21 </div> <div> REVISION NO. 0 22 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> ACTION TAKEN X 18 </div> <div> FUTURE ACTION A 19 </div> <div> EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 </div> <div> SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 </div> <div> HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 </div> <div> ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 </div> <div> NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 </div> <div> PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 </div> <div> COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 0 0 4 0 26 </div> </div>																																																																															
C A U S E D E S C R I P T I O N A N D C O R R E C T I V E A C T I O N S																																																																															
The cause for the cable failure is unknown. Okonite, the cable vendor,																																																																															
has been sent samples of the damaged section for analysis. Any defini-																																																																															
tive conclusions about the failure mode from this examination will be																																																																															
submitted as part of a follow-up report. Power to [RH-P-1A] was re-																																																																															
stored on 1/28/82 at approx. 0400 hours using temporary cable at the switchgear.																																																																															
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> FACILITY STATUS G 28 </div> <div> % POWER 0 0 0 29 </div> <div> OTHER STATUS Design Modification Outage 30 </div> <div> METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 </div> <div> DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Alarm indication 32 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> ACTIVITY RELEASED Z 33 </div> <div> CONTENT OF RELEASE Z 34 </div> <div> AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 </div> <div> LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 0 0 0 37 </div> <div> TYPE Z 38 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION N/A 39 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> PERSONNEL INJURIES 0 0 0 40 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION N/A 41 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY Z 42 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION N/A 43 </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION N/A 45 </div> </div>																																																																															
N R C U S E O N L Y																																																																															

Attachment to LER 82-004/03L  
Beaver Valley Power Station  
Duquesne Light Company  
Docket No. 50-334

On 1/27/82 at 1415 hours a fire alarm was received in the switchgear area. Thirty seconds later the LC Unit Station Service Transformer supply breaker tripped on transformer differential current, the result of a fault in a 4KV bus cable. Both the 1A normal and 1AE emergency busses were deenergized. Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1, which is the backup power supply for the 1AE emergency bus, was out of service for modifications. The loss of the 1AE emergency bus resulted in the loss of the backup residual heat removal pump [RH-P-1A]. Due to single failure considerations this pump was required operable by Tech. Spec. 3.4.1.3. RHR pump [RH-P-1B] was the in-service pump for core decay heat removal at the time.

The Okonite bus cable section that faulted was between the LC Unit Station Service Transformer secondary and the 1A bus supply circuit breaker. The 12 Okonite cables (4 per phase) in the bus are routed through a Husky Cabl-Bus System supported in insulating clamping blocks in a covered cable tray type arrangement. Visual observations of the cables revealed two damaged to the extent of melting the aluminum conductor. Other cables in the cable tray had varying degrees of charred jacketing. Only two cables appeared free of visible effects. There was also some burning and melting of the cable tray side and bottom cover. It was concluded as part of the on-site inspection made by an Okonite representative that it would be difficult to reconstruct the mechanism of failure or determine which cable failed first due to the extent of damage. Samples of the faulted area were taken, however, and given to their representative for testing purposes. If the failure mode can be determined from their tests, the results of their examination will be submitted as a follow-up report.

Possible repair methods have also been discussed. Both the splicing in of identical cable which exists in stock and the replacement of the damaged section with equivalent cable are being considered.