

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
/0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/2/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/8/8/3/ (9)
SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On April 29, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, a loss of Vital Bus 2-1 resulted in /
/0/3/ / losing Residual Heat Removal (RHR) flow for less than one minute when one of two /
/0/4/ / in series RHR Suction Valves (MOV-2700) closed. In addition, one of two Source /
/0/5/ / Range Channels (N-31) and the Containment Particulate and Gaseous Radiation Moni- /
/0/6/ / tors (RM-259 and 260) were de-energized. Since the Vital Bus was promptly re- /
/0/7/ / energized and the de-energized equipment promptly restored, the public health and /
/0/8/ / safety were not affected. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
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/0/9/	/E/B/ (11)	/A/ (12)	/C/ (13)	/C/K/T/B/R/K/ (14)	/A/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
	LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/3/ /-/ /0/3/6/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
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/H/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /Y/ (24) /A/ (25) /G/0/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / This event occurred as maintenance personnel were performing a Ground Isolation /
/1/1/ / Procedure for 125 Volt D.C. Bus 2-1 and shorted the test leads as loads were be- /
/1/2/ / ing transferred to another D.C. Bus. This event caused the input breaker to 2-1 /
/1/3/ / 120 Volt A.C. Vital Bus to open and de-energized the above listed equipment. The /
/1/4/ / Vital Bus and de-energized equipment were restored and normal operation resumed. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /H/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)	8305250384 830518 PDR ADOCK 05000339 S PDR
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/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
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/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NAME OF PREPARER E. Wayne Harrell

PHONE (703) 894-5151

NRC USE ONLY

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-339
Attachment to LER 83-036/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 2

Description of Event

On April 23, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, a loss of power to the 120 volt A.C. 2-I Vital Bus resulted in both Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cooling Loops being out of service when flow was temporarily lost (less than one minute) as one of two in series RHR suction valves closed. Additionally, power was lost to Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel (N-31) and to the Containment Gaseous and Particulate Radiation Monitors (RM-259 and 260). These events are contrary to T.S. 3.9.8.1, 3.9.2 and 3.3.3.1 respectively and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since any increase in Reactor Coolant System temperature was negligible and refueling was stopped when the affected Source Range and Containment Radiation Monitors were de-energized, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

Electrical Maintenance personnel were performing a Ground Isolation Procedure (EMP-C-DC-1) for 125 Volt D.C. Bus 2-I and shorted the test leads together as individual loads were being transferred to another 125 Volt D.C. Bus. This error caused the D.C. Power supply breaker for 120 Volt A.C. Vital Bus 2-I to open. This action de-energized an auxiliary relay for Pressure Channel 2403 which provided for the logic to close MOV-2700 (RHR Suction Valve). As a result MOV-2700 traveled closed and RHR flow decreased to less than required. In addition, both the instrument and control power supplies to Source Range Channel N-31 and the inlet and outlet trip valves and radiation monitoring drawers for the Containment Gaseous and Particulate Radiation Monitors (RM-259 and 260) were de-energized.

Immediate Corrective Action

Within one minute after losing power to 120 Volt A.C. Vital Bus 2-I the power to the Bus was restored by shifting the load to the alternate power supply. The RHR flow was restored after MOV-2700, Suction Valve to the RHR Pumps, was reopened. The affected Radiation Monitors were placed back in service when their common suction and discharge trip valves were reopened and air flow to the monitors was restored. No further action was necessary to restore the affected Source Range Channel.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled action required.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Since the error by maintenance personnel was an isolated incident and they were subsequently informed of the consequences of that error, no further actions are required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.

Vepco

NRG REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 4083 MAY 23 AIO: 34
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

May 18, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. N-83-059
NO/ WFS: nih
Docket No. 50-339
License No. NPF-7

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following License Event Report for North Anna Unit No. 2.

Report No.


Applicable Technical Specifications

LER 83-036/03L-0

T.S. 6.9.1.9.b

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,


E. Wayne Harrell
for Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Document Control Desk (1 copy)
016 Phillips Bldg.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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