

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 12, 1982

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TELEPHONE AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/82-08. This report concerns T.S.3.9.11, "The fuel handling ventilation exhaust system shall be operating and discharging through the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers". This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.


P3N/jfw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C.

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
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Mr. P. R. Bemis
Senior Resident Inspector
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO. 82-08

REPORT DATE: February 12, 1982

FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC

IDENTIFICATION: Failure to Take the Required Sample from the Fuel
Pool Ventilation System Charcoal Absorber

DISCUSSION: On January 15, 1982, while examining various programs on the operator aid computer, it was noticed that the equipment run time on the fuel pool ventilation system (VF) was 300 hours for the month and 2149.9 hours for the cumulative total. (The total actual run time is the sum of the monthly total and cumulative total). Since Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.9.11.2(b) requires that a sample be taken from the charcoal absorber after 720 hours of operation and no samples had been taken, the VF system was declared inoperable. This incident is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 3.9.11. Unit 1 was in mode 1 at the time the incident was discovered.

Since the VF system was out of specification and required sampling, a sample was taken and sent to Nuclear Containment Systems for analysis. On January 22, it was determined that the sample meet its acceptance criteria. Therefore, the VF system was declared operable the same day.

EVALUATION: During the early part of 1981, the only safety-related system which was accumulating any run time was the control area HVAC system (VC). (Note that the equipment run time consists of the time the system runs with flow through its filters and not in bypass). In October when spent fuel was being received from Oconee, the VF system was started and ran continuously. There was no need for the VF system to be operating continuously, but the person responsible did not foresee any problems in doing so. There was no procedure to cover the monitoring of the filter systems, and apparently the responsible staff person had just checked the VC system because, to his knowledge, it was the only system accumulating time.

The charcoal absorber is used to remove radioiodine from the air in the fuel pool area during fuel movement and operation of the crane over the fuel pool with a load. The analysis of the sample verified that the charcoal absorber was functional during the receiving of the 16 spent fuel assemblies from Oconee. However, the unnecessary operation of the charcoal absorber reduced the operating life of the charcoal by one-half.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: The VF system serves no function to the plant in the event of a LOCA; therefore, safe operation of the plant was not affected by this incident. Since the analysis of the charcoal sample verified the charcoal functional, the charcoal absorber was capable and presently is capable of performing its designed function of removing radioiodine from the atmosphere in the fuel pool area. The health and safety of the public were not compromised by this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: When it was discovered that the time for sampling had passed, the VF system was declared inoperable, and a charcoal sample taken. With the VF system inoperable, no fuel movement was allowed in the fuel pool; therefore the spent fuel cask which arrived on January 18 was put in storage until the VF system was made operable.

A periodic test procedure, "Safety-Related Filter System Run Time Monitoring", was written to ensure that all the necessary systems are monitored. The VF system will be operated through the charcoal absorber only when necessary, and the procedure "B&W Spent Fuel Receipt, Storage and Shipping with an NLI Cask", will be changed accordingly.

The person involved and all personnel in the plant will be reminded that they should be aware of changing conditions in the plant, and they need to respond to these conditions. Also, the section head of the person involved was advised to take the necessary corrective action to prevent recurrence.