

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 27 CAT 58

CONT
 0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 1 3 1 8 2 8 0 2 2 6 8 2 5
 6 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 62 63 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 12 With unit no.2 at 100% power, a circuit check revealed that AMP Readings for Heat
 0 13 Tracing Circuits 23A, and C on panels 8 and 9, were below the acceptance criteria
 0 14 stipulated in PT 27C. This event is contrary to T.S.3.3.A.4 and T.S.3.2.C.5 and
 0 15 reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2). Primary System make-up operations verified that the
 0 16 required flow path was operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public
 0 17 were not affected.

0 18

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
 S H 11 A 12 B 13 H E A T E R 14 Z 15 Z 16
 17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 18 8 2 19 0 1 2 20 0 3 21 L 22 0
 23 0 24 0 25 0 26 0 27 0 28 29 30 31 32
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NRPD-4 FORM SUB PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
 33 C 18 F 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 22 Y 23 N 24 A 25 C 26 6 8 27
 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 10 The loss of Heat Tracing was apparently due to an inadvertant damaging of the heat
 1 11 tracing tape during clean up operations in the boric acid transfer pump area. The
 1 12 defective heat tracing was replaced and tested satisfactorily.

1 13

1 14

1 15 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A 30 B 31 Circuit Check 32

1 16 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 Z 33 Z 34 N/A 35 N/A 36

1 17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39

1 18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 0 0 0 40 N/A 41

1 19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 Z 42 N/A 43

1 20 PUBLICITY ISSUED - DESCRIPTION
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 8203080369 820226 N/A
 PDR ADOCK 05000280
 S PDR

NAME OF PREPARED J. L. Wilson

PHONE (804) 357-3184

NRC USE ONLY

68 69 80 91 92 93

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 82-012/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 01-31-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With unit no. 2 at 100% power, a circuit check revealed that amp readings for Heat Tracing panels 8 and 9, circuits 23A, and C were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in PT 27C. The affected circuits serve unit #2 boric acid filter, and flow transmitter FT-2113. This event is contrary to T.S.3.3.A.4 and T.S.3.2.C.5 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

A Primary system makeup operation, verified that the required flow path was operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The loss of Heat Tracing was apparently due to the inadvertant damaging of the Heat Tracing Tape during clean up operations in the boric acid transfer pump area.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to commence maintenance activities and verify Boric acid flow to the charging pumps.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The defective Heat Tracing was replaced and tested within the time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Technicians assigned to cleanup and decontamination responsibilities have been instructed to use caution when performing cleaning operations in the vicinity of safety related systems.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.