

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 C A D I C P 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 A 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 L 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 7 0 4 1 9 8 3 8 0 5 0 3 8 3 9
7 8 9 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 Prior to fuel load, grinding wheel and rotary file gouges were discovered
03 on the main coolant system piping on the discharge side of #3 main
04 coolant pump. Of the four gouges discovered, the most severe is
05 approximately .150 inches deep x 2 inches long x .150 inches wide.
06 This event has in no way affected public health and safety. Reportable
07 per Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.c.

09 C B 11 X 12 Z 13 P I P I E X X 14 E 15 Z 16
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 COMP SUBCODE 14 VALVE SUBCODE 15
17 8 3 1 0 0 4 1 0 8 T 0
7 8 9 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 EVENT YEAR 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 23 OCCURRENCE CODE 24 REPORT TYPE 25 REVISION NO. 26
ACTION TAKEN 27 FUTURE ACTION 28 EFFECT ON PLANT 29 SHUTDOWN METHOD 30 HOURS 31 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 32 NPRD-4 FORM SUB 33 PRIME COMP SUPPLIER 34 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 35
X 18 D 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 N 25 W 1 1 2 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 Gouges were intentionally caused by persons unknown. A Nonconformance
11 Report was written and a Technical Review Group was convened to evaluate
12 this occurrence. A Westinghouse metallurgist and a Bechtel metallurgist
13 were consulted during the evaluation. The evaluation concluded that the
14 gouges could be removed by grinding and blending while (cont'd on att.)

15 B 28 0 0 0 29 NA 30 D 31 Discovered during construction
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 % POWER 11 OTHER STATUS 12 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 13 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 14

16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36
7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT 10 RELEASED OF RELEASE 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 12 LOCATION OF RELEASE 13

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 10 NUMBER 11 TYPE 12 DESCRIPTION 13

12 0 0 0 40 NA 41
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 10 NUMBER 11 DESCRIPTION 12

19 D 42 Small Gouges in Reactor Coolant Piping 43
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 10 TYPE 11 DESCRIPTION 12

20 Y 44 PGandE News Release on April 22, 1983 45
7 8 9 PUBLICITY 10 ISSUED 11 DESCRIPTION 12

NAME OF REPORTER William J. Kelly

PHONE (805) 595-7351

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued)

maintaining minimum pipe wall thickness. The repairs will be made in accordance with an approved ASME Section XI repair program.

Corrective Action:

1. A 100% visual inspection of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary where insulation was removed will be conducted prior to fuel load.
2. Prior to heatup, all uninsulated Class 2 piping connecting to the reactor coolant system inside containment will have a 100% visual inspection.
3. Briefings have been held with construction and contractor supervision and PGandE Nuclear Plant Operations personnel to inform them of the incident in order to increase general awareness and to promote watchfulness for potential similar events.
4. Since the middle of March, the Project has added a substantial number of additional supervisors to monitor all construction activities within the Protected Area. This increased supervision should serve as a deterrent to future incidents of this nature.
5. As a result of this occurrence, construction supervisors have been instructed to increase their awareness of specific work tasks in progress and specific individuals assigned to each work task.
6. As a result of this occurrence, the Security Department has increased the frequency of patrols within the work force areas in order to increase the visibility of security forces.
7. Project startup engineers and/or plant personnel are continuing daily walkdown and inspection of Unit 1 and common vital areas. They are instructed to be alert for and report any anomalous conditions observed.
8. Construction personnel have been and will continue to be informed of job security as relates to work schedules in order to minimize the possibility of deliberate acts to extend work.
9. Investigation is continuing in an effort to identify the individual or individuals responsible for this incident.
10. PGandE, as a member of the Construction Industry Crime Prevention Program, is instituting their program at Diablo Canyon. A key feature of this program is the offering of a reward of up to \$1000 for information resulting in arrest, restitution or recovery of theft or vandalism of tools, equipment, material or property.

A bulletin calling attention to this program will be distributed to all Project personnel and other on-site PGandE personnel this week. In addition, a training program discussing vandalism; including penalties, reporting, potential risks to the public, and possible types of vandalism to be alert for, is in preparation and is scheduled to be implemented by the middle of May.

Finally, posters explaining the Construction Industry Crime Prevention Program are being placed at various locations throughout the plant.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JDS
JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

May 3, 1983

Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 83-004/08T-0
Gouge in Main Coolant System Piping

Dear Mr. Martin:

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.12.c of the Technical Specifications, Appendix A to the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Operating License, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted concerning the discovery of gouges in the main coolant system piping. An additional report will be submitted per 10 CFR 73.71.

This event has in no way affected public health and safety.

Sincerely,



JDS:vk

Enclosure

cc w/enc: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Service List

11
IE-22
83-99