

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1
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W	I	P	B	H	2
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 (2)

0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
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 (3)

4	1	1	1	1	1
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 (4)

5

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CONT

0	1
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L

 (6)

0	5	0	0	0	3	0	1
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 (7)

0	4	2	8	8	3
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 (8)

0	5	1	1	8	3
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 (9)
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(0 2) On 04/18/83, after insulation had been removed from the "A" loop RTD

(0 3) bypass line on Unit 2 for ISI purposes, Maintenance personnel found

(0 4) evidence of a body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559A, the "A" loop RTD bypass

(0 5) isolation valve. Further evaluation on 04/28/83 disclosed boric acid

(0 6) wastage of 4 of 12 studs. This occurrence is reportable in accordance

(0 7) with TS 15.6.9.2.A.3 as an abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant

(0 8) pressure boundary.

0	9
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C	B
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 (11)

E

 (12)

B

 (13)

V	A	L	V	E	X
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 (14)

E

 (15)

D

 (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20(17) LER/RO
REPORT
NUMBER

EVENT YEAR

SEQUENTIAL
REPORT NO.OCCURRENCE
CODEREPORT
TYPEREVISION
NO.ACTION
TAKENFUTURE
ACTIONEFFECT
ON PLANTSHUTDOWN
METHOD

HOURS

ATTACHMENT
SUBMITTEDNPRD-4
FORM SUB.PRIME COMP.
SUPPLIERCOMPONENT
MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

(1 0) It is believed that a body-to-bonnet leak on valve RC-559A caused the

(1 1) wastage of the 4 studs. All of the studs and nuts on RC-559A were

(1 2) replaced and the bolting on the identical valve of the other loop was

(1 3) examined yielding no recordable indications.

1	5
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H

 (28)

0	0	0
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 (29)

NA

B

 (31) Inservice Inspection (32)
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1	6
---	---

Z

 (33)

Z

 (34)

NA

NA

 (36)
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1	7
---	---

0	0	0
---	---	---

 (37)

Z

 (38)

NA

 (39)
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1	8
---	---

0	0	0
---	---	---

 (40)

NA

 (41)
7 8 9 11 12 80

1	9
---	---

Z

 (42)

NA

 (43)
7 8 9 10 80

2	0
---	---

N

 (44)

NA

 (45)
7 8 9 10 80

NAME OF PREPARER C. W. Fay

PHONE 414/277-2811

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 83-005/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2
Docket No. 50-301

In preparation for inservice inspection of a weld on the "A" loop common RTD bypass return line, insulation was removed from the line revealing unusually high levels of surface contamination on the piping surface. An investigation by Maintenance personnel on April 18, 1983 as to the possible cause of the contamination revealed evidence of a body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559A, "A" loop isolation valve for the RTD bypass return line.

Valve RC-559A was disassembled by Maintenance and the studs examined on April 18. There was evidence of boric acid wastage on four of the twelve studs. The studs and nuts were replaced with new ones and the valve was reassembled on April 18. The following manufacturing data applies to the affected valve:

Manufacturer:	Velan Valve Manufacturing Co.
Size:	3"
Rating:	1500#
Type:	Manual Gate
Drawing:	88406
Bolting Material:	A193 GRB7
Bolting Size:	5/8-11 UNC x 4 5/8"

The degradation of the bolting was evaluated on April 28 and determined to be reparable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.3 as an abnormal degradation discovered in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

The evaluation of the affected studs determined that the extent of the boric acid wastage was as follows:

<u>Stud</u>	<u>Original Diameter</u>	<u>Depth of Wastage</u>
1	5/8"	1/16"
2	5/8"	5/32"
3	5/8"	5/32"
4	5/8"	5/16"

One additional valve of similar design was examined with no indication of boric acid wastage of the bolting noted. The additional valve examined was RC-559B, the "B" loop RTD bypass line return isolation valve (3" Velan gate valve). Two other similar valves, RC-543, "A" loop decon connection isolation valve (4" Velan gate valve), and RC-544, "B" loop decon connection isolation valve (4" Velan gate valve), will be examined for evidence of boric acid wastage during this refueling outage. These examinations will be conducted with the bolting in place.

To allow easy inspection of the bolting on RC-559A and RC-559B and to aid in future leak detection removable insulation will be installed on these valves.

For the past six months, there has been a slight increase in containment airborne particulate activity. It is believed that the body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559A may have contributed to this.

The health and safety of the public was not endangered by this occurrence.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

May 11, 1983

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NO. 50-301
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 83-005/01T-0
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 83-005/01T-0
(a 14-day follow-up report) with an attachment which provides
a description of an event reportable in accordance with
Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.3, "Abnormal degradation
discovered in fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or primary containment."

Very truly yours,

Vice President-Nuclear Power

C. W. Fay

Enclosure

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector

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MAY 13 1983