

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | | |

1 6

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>58</u>									
					LICENSEE CODE									LICENSE NUMBER													LICENSE TYPE																
<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>		REPORT SOURCE			<u>16</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>19</u>									
										DOCKET NUMBER											EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE												

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

On 2/3/83, while in mode 1 at 86% full power, the hydraulic pump for the operator for emergency feedwater (EFW) control valve 2CV-1075-1 was determined to need replacing during performance of preventative maintenance (PM) on the valve. On 2/4/83, and on 2/17/83, while in mode 3, 2CV-1075-1 failed to close while attempting to reduce flow to 'B' steam generator. 2CV-1075-1 is the control valve between EFW pump 2P-7B and valve 2CV-1036-1 in the EFW train to 'B' steam generator. The redundant EFW pump 2P-7A and its associated train were operable during each occurrence. In all three cases, 2CV-1075-1 was returned to service within the time limits of T.S. 3.7.1.2. This occurrence is reportable per T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. Previous occurrences regarding

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		REVISION	
17		18		19		20				21		22		23	
LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	11		12		13				14		15		16	
REPORT	18	10		11		13				14		15		16	
NUMBER	21	22		23		24				25		26		27	
ACTION	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	
TAKEN	19	20		21		22				23		24		25	
18	34	35		36		37				38		39		40	
33	34	35		36		37				38		39		40	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 | CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27
1 1 | The cause of the occurrence of 2/3/83, was thought to be end of service life of the hydraulic pump. Corrective
1 2 | action taken at the time was pump and motor bearing replacement. The hydraulic pump failed again on 2/14/83.
1 3 | A failure analysis identified the following problems: (1) The mounting for the override switch in the
1 4 | hydraulic control system was inadequate to allow the switches to stay in adjustment, thereby, causing the
8 9 | hydraulic pump to run continuously. (2) The hydraulic pump was highly susceptible to failure when subjected

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION								
1	5	X	28	0	8	6	29	See item 10	30	8	31	PM and Operator observation	32
8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46						

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
1 6 8	1 2 33	1 NA	1 35 NA
9	10	11	136
		44	45
			80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										44	45	80
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION								
1	7	0	0	0	37	2	38	NA				
8	9	11	12	13							139	

PERSONNEL INJURIES										80
NUMBER				DESCRIPTION						
1	8	1	0	0	0	40	NA			
9			11	12						41
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY										80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 1 Z 42 1 NA
PUBLICITY
8303150484 830228
05000368
ADOCK 05000368
830228

[illegible]

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LER No. 50-368-83-007/03L-0

Occurrence Date: 02/03/83

Event Description and Probable Consequence (Continued)

hydraulic problems were reported in Unit 2 LER's 79-043, 79-088, 79-089, 79-090, 79-092, 80-003, 81-032, 82-019 and 83-005.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

to running continuously or with contaminants in the oil supply. (3) The valve block assembly is susceptible to failure when pump wear or failure contaminates the oil supply. A design change was implemented which replaced the original design gear pump with a piston pump which vendor testing has demonstrated to be more reliable, and a modification was made to the override switch mounting bracket to prevent it from coming loose. In addition, the hydraulic system was flushed per vendor instructions and filled with oil that was filtered as it was installed. The occurrence of 2/17/83, was a result of improperly set manifold block relief valves. The vendor had previously stated that the relief valve settings were factory set at 1000 psi. As a result, per vendor recommendations, the relief valve settings were not confirmed prior to the occurrence on 2/17/83. Investigation later revealed that the actual settings were low (600 psi) causing the relief valves to be challenged by normal hydraulic system operating pressure. The relief valves were set to the recommended 1000 psi setting, and the control pressure switch setting was adjusted to allow optimum hydraulic system operation. Valve 2CV-1075-1 was proved operable and returned to service. As stated in previous LER's, replacement operators for 2CV-1075-1 and its similar valve 2CV-1025-1 are being sought. The valve operator is manufactured by the Nuclear Valve Division of Borg-Warner Corporation. Nuclear Valve Division was formerly known as Weston Hydraulics.