

1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

SYSTEM CODE C J 11		CAUSE CODE E 12		CAUSE SUBCODE B 13		COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X 14		COMP. SUBCODE F 15		VALVE SUBCODE B 16	
EVENT YEAR 8 3 21 22		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 8 23 24 26		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 27 28 29		REPORT TYPE L 30 31		REVISION NO. 0 32			
ACTION TAKEN X 18 33		FUTURE ACTION X 19 34		EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 35		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 36		HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 37 40		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 41	
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 42		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 43		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 6 3 5 26 44 47					

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	5	E	28	0	8	5	29	N/A	B
ACTIVITY CONTENT		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE					
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	N/A			
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A	
PERSONNEL INJURIES		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	8	0	0	0	40			N/A	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION					
1	9	Z	42						
PUBLICITY		DESCRIPTION							
1	0	N	44						

DATE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-008/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 02-04-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: PCV-1455C WOULD NOT CYCLE

1. Description of the Event

Unit 1 was at 85% power when PCV-1455C failed to cycle during the performance of PT-2.26, RCS Pressure Test. This is contrary to T.S.-3.1.A.6.a and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. The code safeties were operable as well as the redundant PORV, therefore, the health and safety of the public remained unaffected.

3. Cause

The valve would not fully stroke due to apparent stem binding. This was determined as a result of the following troubleshooting: 1) the two solenoid valves normally supplying air to the PORV were replaced. 2) air was applied directly to the valve operator. Both attempts failed to produce full valve stem travel.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The block valve was verified closed and de-energized.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The valve will be disassembled, inspected and repaired as necessary during the present outage.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None deemed necessary at this time.

7. Generic Implications

None.